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Joshua E. Weishart* 
A debate about whether all children are entitled to an “equal” or an “ade-
quate” education has been waged at the forefront of school finance policy for 
decades. In an era of budget deficits and harsh cuts in public education, I submit 
that it is time to move on.  
Equality of educational opportunity has been thought to require equal 
spending per pupil or spending adjusted to the needs of differently situated chil-
dren. Adequacy has been understood to require a level of spending sufficient to 
satisfy some absolute, rather than relative, educational threshold. In practice, 
however, many courts interpreting their states’ constitutional obligations have 
fused the equality and adequacy theories. Certain federal laws express principles 
of both doctrines. And gradually, more advocates and scholars have come to en-
dorse hybrid equality-adequacy approaches. Still, the debate persists over seem-
ingly intractable conceptual precepts and their political and legal ramifications. 
Tracking the philosophical origins and evolution of equality and adequacy 
as legal doctrines, I explain the significance of their points of convergence and 
argue that the few points of divergence are untenable in practice. Equality of ed-
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ucational opportunity should not be interpreted as pursuing equal chances for 
educational achievement for all children, because that ideal is infeasible. Nor 
should educational adequacy be interpreted as completely indifferent to objec-
tionable inequalities that can be feasibly curtailed. Properly conceived, equality 
and adequacy are not merely congruent but reciprocal. That is, children are 
owed an education that is adequately equal and equally adequate.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the pursuit of educational justice, practice often outpaces theory. Educa-
tional equality and adequacy theories have been understood to impose different 
demands. As generally conceived by equality theorists, justice dictates that all 
children have equal educational opportunities. Adequacy theorists typically 
construe the demands of justice as requiring that all children have access to a 
certain threshold of educational opportunities. For decades, however, a number 
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of courts have incorporated or invoked equality and adequacy in tandem,1 even 
as a burgeoning literature has contrasted the two theories.2 A few scholars per-
ceived the convergence early on,3 but the trend to embrace the theories as com-
plementary is relatively recent.4 Some commentators now propose theories that 
merge equality and adequacy toward “equity plus,”5 “‘meaningful’ educational 
opportunity,”6 or “comparability.”7 Even among staunch proponents of equality 
 
 1. Richard Briffault, Adding Adequacy to Equity, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE 
LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 25, 27 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson 
eds., 2007); see also William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A 
Re-Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1283-96 (2003) (explaining that no clear line divides equality 
theories from adequacy theories and that, in fact, both theories are present in most education 
finance cases).  
 2. For general discussions of the equality-adequacy debate, see Derrick Darby & 
Richard E. Levy, Slaying the Inequality Villain in School Finance: Is the Right to Education 
the Silver Bullet?, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351 (2011); and William S. Koski & Rob 
Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and 
Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545 (2006). 
 3. See Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State 
Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 27 (describing “hybrid” equality-adequacy law-
suits as “using the language of equality as just one measure of adequacy to advance the qual-
ity of education” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Frank I. Michelman, 
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 58 (1969) (finding educational inequality to be 
closely related to “educational deprivation”); Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy 
as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 493, 516-19 (1995) (suggesting that “ade-
quacy” is merely a form of “vertical equity”). 
 4. See Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protec-
tion: The First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1343, 1372-73 (2010) (“[Reformers] have thus far largely experimented with equity 
and adequacy as separate theories and remedies, but in many respects the two are inter-
twined.”); Darby & Levy, supra note 2, at 369 (“[A] fully satisfactory theory of justice in 
education should account for the importance of both adequacy and equality.”); James E. 
Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Finance Litigation: Emerging 
Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 469 (2004) (“Adequacy and eq-
uity may be distinct legal theories, but they blur considerably in practice.”). 
 5. William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8 EDUC. 
POL’Y 376, 379-80 (1994). 
 6. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Nec-
essary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1470 (2007). 
 7. JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, 
AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 150-51 (2010); James 
E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1232-39 
(2008). 
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or adequacy, there is an emerging recognition that the theories are not entirely 
incompatible.8  
Nevertheless, several equality and adequacy advocates remain entrenched, 
insisting that one theory should override or constrain the other.9 And, although 
some courts have linked equality and adequacy, judges and legislatures contin-
ue to “struggle with a remedy” in part because the paradigms are elusive.10 The 
concern that these concepts elude judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards further obfuscates the controversy and contributes to the growing re-
luctance of state courts to intervene when legislatures fail to fulfill their affirm-
ative obligations to provide an adequate or equal education.11 Hence, the  
decades-long equality versus adequacy debate lingers over seemingly irrecon-
cilable conceptual differences and legal impracticalities.  
My aim in this Article is to enumerate the points of convergence between 
equality and adequacy and to show that their residual conflicting tenets are un-
sustainable in practice. Equality and adequacy are not mutually exclusive; in-
deed, I contend that they are mutually reinforcing. To apprehend their symbio-
sis, we must delve deeper into each theory’s philosophical foundations without 
losing sight of how the concepts are operationalized in law and policy. I suspect 
that part of the reason that the equality versus adequacy debate persists is that 
the practitioners, legal academics, and political philosophers who have engaged 
in it have done so within their respective disciplines. Although a few scholars 
have observed parallel themes and polemics, they have declined to confront 
them in depth.12  
 
 8. See Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Educational Equality Versus Educational 
Adequacy: A Critique of Anderson and Satz, 26 J. APPLIED PHIL. 117, 118 (2009) (“Jus-
tice . . . demands adequacy, but it also demands equality—even if those demands must some-
times be balanced against each other, and against other demands it makes.”); Debra Satz, 
Equality, Adequacy, and Educational Policy, 3 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 424, 435 (2008) (“Ade-
quacy for citizenship has egalitarian dimensions. . . . Many of its practical implications are 
likely to be similar to those endorsed by vertical equality of opportunity theorists.”).  
 9. See Elizabeth Anderson, Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality 
Perspective, 117 ETHICS 595, 597, 614-20 (2007); Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Putting 
Educational Equality in Its Place, 3 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 444, 446-48 (2008); Koski & 
Reich, supra note 2, at 606-13; Satz, supra note 8, at 435-36. 
 10. See Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 566.  
 11. See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Edu-
cational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 
701, 741 (2010); Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of 
Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 83, 95-120 (2010). 
 12. See Darby & Levy, supra note 2, at 369 (“Although there is much to be said for 
and against each of these philosophical conceptions . . . , our present concern is not to pick a 
side in this debate . . . .”); Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 595 (“It would be impossible to 
do justice here to the complexity of the philosophical arguments in favor of egalitarianism 
over sufficientarianism or for equality over adequacy.”). 
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By pairing the philosophical and doctrinal analysis, however, we can per-
ceive that equality and adequacy are reciprocal in theory, as they have been at 
times in practice. I negotiate this dual analysis by surveying the development of 
equality and adequacy as legal doctrines reflective of their philosophical herit-
ages but constrained in their real-world application.13 
 Part I thus begins on the equality side of the debate with a review of equali-
ty of opportunity as the favored distributive principle of many contemporary 
egalitarians. John Rawls pioneered a substantive “fair equality of opportunity” 
theory, which entails, among other things, a universal education system devised 
to counteract the differential effects of children’s social circumstances (e.g., 
class and race), so that their educational achievement is solely a function of in-
nate talent and effort. Rivaling Rawlsian equality of opportunity, luck egalitari-
anism demands the neutralization of all unchosen social and natural circum-
stances (i.e., luck), so that educational achievement is solely a function of 
individual choice.  
The evolution of equality of educational opportunity as it has been embod-
ied in the law suggests that it is conceptually more ambitious than Rawlsian 
equality of opportunity but less demanding in practice than luck egalitarianism. 
Increasingly, scholars, advocates, and courts think the concept is best expressed 
through “vertical equity,” a remedial school finance scheme that aims to miti-
gate natural and social disadvantages by allocating greater resources to the 
neediest students.14 I assess a defense of this view by educational equality theo-
rists Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift against the potentially fatal parental lib-
erty objection—the argument that equality of educational opportunity cannot be 
realized without unduly infringing on the liberty of parents. 
In Part II, I conduct a similar review of the adequacy theory, noting that it 
is philosophically consonant with the sufficiency doctrine. Sufficientarians sub-
scribe to the notion that “what is important from the point of view of morality 
is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough.”15 
Elizabeth Anderson’s “democratic equality” is perhaps the most comprehensive 
account of sufficiency as a distributive principle, demanding that all children 
 
 13. In philosophy parlance, I employ a “nonideal” methodology that analyzes princi-
ples against feasibility constraints to determine whether they are likely to be effective given 
the injustices of our imperfect world and assuming less than full compliance. See A. John 
Simmons, Ideal and Nonideal Theory, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5 (2010) (explaining Rawls’s 
distinction between ideal and nonideal theories of justice). 
 14. Underwood, supra note 3, at 495 (“These two forms of inequality, innate and envi-
ronmental, bring forth the need for vertical equity—the rationale for treating individuals dif-
ferently in an attempt to mitigate these inequalities.” (citation omitted)).  
 15. Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21, 21 (1987); see also 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 240 (1986). 
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have a sufficient level of capabilities to function as equal citizens.16 Also con-
cerned with “civic equality,” Debra Satz joins Anderson in advocating for an 
adequacy threshold in education.17  
Adequacy has been considered the “dominant legal theory” since the influx 
of the “third wave” of school finance litigation; the first two waves were 
thought to surge predominantly toward equality.18 Yet the theory is assailed for 
its inherent ambiguity19 and, more fundamentally, for its indifference to ine-
qualities above the threshold that can “exacerbate the positional advantage of 
some students from better off school districts over disadvantaged students from 
worse off school districts.”20 I assess Anderson’s and Satz’s responses to this 
criticism, which I call the fairness objection. 
Notwithstanding the philosophical and legal conduits of the equality-
adequacy stalemate, I argue in Part III that the theories share at least four sig-
nificant points of convergence. First, most theorists and practitioners grant that 
equality and adequacy should not be construed as absolute, a priori moral prin-
ciples. Rather, they have been conceived and employed in ways that are con-
sistent with value pluralism. Second, despite conventional wisdom juxtaposing 
equality as the archetypal relational concept and adequacy as inherently non-
relative, adequacy’s comparative qualities have been repeatedly demonstrated 
in its application. Third, egalitarians agree with a central tenet of adequacy—
that absolute educational deprivation is morally wrong and that all children are 
entitled to a minimally adequate education. Fourth, sufficientarians agree with a 
central tenet held by many egalitarians—that public education should advance 
social equality.  
As I explain, these four intersections pave a way to abandon equality’s and 
adequacy’s most extreme and problematic elements, which are exposed by the 
parental liberty and fairness objections. Specifically, the viability of the equali-
ty theory is diminished insofar as the objective is to ensure equal chances for 
educational achievement for all children. The adequacy theory is conversely 
flawed in its indifference to objectionable inequalities in educational opportuni-
 
 16. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 289, 316 
(1999). 
 17. Satz, supra note 8, at 425. 
 18. Ryan & Saunders, supra note 4, at 466 & n.19, 467 (citing William E. Thro, The 
Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of 
Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990)) (explaining legal 
theories advanced in school finance litigation and crediting William Thro with developing 
wave metaphor, which “has subsequently become ubiquitous”). 
 19. See Amy L. Moore, When Enough Isn’t Enough: Qualitative and Quantitative As-
sessments of Adequate Education in State Constitutions by State Supreme Courts, 41 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 545, 548-55, 562-75 (2010) (discussing theoretical and practical difficulties in defin-
ing adequacy).  
 20. Darby & Levy, supra note 2, at 368. 
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ties above the guaranteed threshold. Some courts seem to appreciate these 
complementary defects, which explains why “‘equity’ cases tend to call for eq-
uity up to a point,” while “‘adequacy’ cases tend to be more tolerant of inequal-
ities in resources but only up to a point.”21 
Amending these unsound premises not only resolves the most forceful ob-
jections to equality and adequacy but also provides space to accommodate their 
respective normative appeals to fairness, responsibility, and a social basis for 
respect. The picture of educational justice that emerges, then, is one in which 
all children are owed an adequately equal and equally adequate education. The 
practical significance of that symbiosis is that policymakers are not conceptual-
ly bound to either equality or adequacy. That conclusion has not been lost on a 
few courts that have geared education policy toward equality and adequacy—
conceivably, a less vexing and more determinate standard. Transcending the 
debate in this manner affords advocates and lawmakers latitude to advance ed-
ucational justice along the points where equality and adequacy intersect.  
I. EQUALITY 
The principle of equality of educational opportunity as we know it today in 
the United States is the product of many variables—economic development, 
cultural shifts, demographic changes, and social movements—that provoked 
remedial legislation and pathbreaking lawsuits. Along the way, equality advo-
cates have sought justice through tangible and meaningful reforms, such as 
ending racial segregation, securing more money for poor school districts, and 
establishing procedural and substantive educational rights for children with dis-
abilities. To be sure, those advocates did not consult Rawls for their litigation 
strategies, legislatures did not assess whether their education budgets comport-
ed with the aims of luck egalitarianism, and judges did not resort to the political 
philosophy du jour to decide school finance cases.  
Nevertheless, it is no coincidence that the arguments litigants make, the ra-
tionales courts provide, and the language legislatures adopt frequently echo 
philosophical principles derived from logic and widely shared intuitions. Arm-
chair theorizing may be a methodology unique to philosophy, but it tends to 
yield notions of fairness and morality that confirm and substantiate our precon-
ceived and evolving judgments. Thus, we should reflect on the philosophical 
undercurrent that pervades our sense of educational justice.22 
 
 21. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1251. 
 22. Obviously, there are philosophies, such as libertarianism, that do not regard educa-
tion as an individual right or duty of the state and tend to see “educational justice” in a much 
different light. I do not mean to dismiss these viewpoints entirely by omitting them from this 
discussion. Rather, because equality and adequacy are the focus of this Article, and those 
theories have been understood and applied in ways that presuppose the state’s obligation to 
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To that end, the starting point of contemporary egalitarianism is the propo-
sition that everyone should be treated with “equal concern and respect.”23 In-
deed, “[n]early all agree with the principle that members of a political commu-
nity should be treated as equals . . . . What they disagree about is what 
‘treatment as an equal’ amounts to.”24 
Despite their disagreement over the proper object of equalization, egalitari-
ans are virtually unanimous in their rejection of absolute equality of results (or 
outcomes)—the idea that everyone should realize the same economic and social 
conditions.25 Liberty would be the first fatality of a regime pursuing equality of 
results.26 Moreover, equalizing results does not respect individuality, personal 
responsibility, or difference; it values only equality.27 On a larger scale, it is 
inefficient: with little or no incentive for competition, a society’s productivity 
and progression would stagnate.28 Accordingly, we might begin to understand 
equality of opportunity by appreciating that it is not, strictly speaking, equality 
of results.29  
 
provide education to all children, I have confined my analysis to philosophies that entail a 
great deal of public intervention.  
 23. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977); see Louis Pojman, On 
Equal Human Worth: A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism, in EQUALITY: SELECTED 
READINGS 282, 282 (Louis P. Pojman & Robert Westmoreland eds., 1997) (“While there are 
differences between contemporary egalitarian arguments, they all accept . . . that each person 
is of equal intrinsic value, of ‘dignity’ and thus ought to be treated with equal respect and be 
given equal rights.”). Dworkin coined the phrase “equal concern and respect” and elaborated 
on its meaning over the course of three decades. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS 351-63 (2011); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 2 (2000) [hereinafter DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE]. 
 24. ADAM SWIFT, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A BEGINNERS’ GUIDE FOR STUDENTS AND 
POLITICIANS 93 (2001); see also Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 594 (citing seminal works 
in the debate over the proper equalisandum). 
 25. See Paula Casal & Andrew Williams, Equality, in ISSUES IN POLITICAL THEORY, 
149, 163-65 (Catriona McKinnon ed., 2008); Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Egalitarianism, 
Option Luck, and Responsibility, 111 ETHICS 548, 550 (2001); Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck, 
Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities, 112 ETHICS 529, 530-31 (2002). But see 
Anne Phillips, Defending Equality of Outcome, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 18 (2004).  
 26. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 132 (1983). 
 27. See LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 177 (1987). 
 28. See PAUL H. RUBIN, DARWINIAN POLITICS: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF 
FREEDOM 28 (2002). 
 29. See DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 64 (1981); Ferenc Feher & Agnes Heller, 
Forms of Equality, in JUSTICE 149, 152-53 (Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 
1980). But see Lawrence B. Joseph, Some Ways of Thinking About Equality of Opportunity, 
33 W. POL. Q. 393, 393 (1980) (explaining that certain conceptions of equality of opportuni-
ty can be compatible with equality of results); David A. Strauss, The Illusory Distinction Be-
tween Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 51, 51-52, 
62-63 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 1998) (arguing that the familiar distinction 
between equality of opportunity and equality of results is illusory).  
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Similarly, equality of educational opportunity does not insist that all chil-
dren reach the same educational attainment.30 To be sure, equality advocates 
want to reduce disparities in educational outcomes (e.g., graduation rates and 
test scores), but even those who propose that legislatures and courts take an 
“outcomes-based approach” aim merely to improve educational outcomes 
overall, especially for disadvantaged children; they have no delusion that all 
children can or want to achieve the same outcomes.31 Rather, most educational 
equality theorists and egalitarians, as well as many Americans,32 think that eve-
ryone should have a fair and equal chance—an equal opportunity—to achieve 
certain desired educational, economic, and social outcomes.  
A. Equality of Opportunity 
Endorsed by Supreme Court Justices,33 codified in federal laws,34 and 
revered by everyday believers in the “American Dream,”35 equality of oppor-
 
 30. See Satz, supra note 8, at 427 (“Few people support the idea that educational out-
comes for all children should be equal: not only is such an ideal unrealistic, but it is also evi-
dent that not all children will be equally capable or equally motivated to learn.”); Mark G. 
Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411, 420 (1973) 
(“Apparently no one is willing to urge the preposterous notion that equal educational oppor-
tunity requires that every child, regardless of ability, perform at the same level.”). 
 31. See Darby & Levy, supra note 2, at 378-82, 387. 
 32. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530 (1996) (“Women need not be 
guaranteed equal ‘results,’ . . . but the Equal Protection Clause does require equal opportuni-
ty . . . .” (quoting United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 93 (4th Cir. 1995) (Motz, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); DEREK BOK, THE 
STATE OF THE NATION: GOVERNMENT AND THE QUEST FOR A BETTER SOCIETY 10 (1996) 
(“Americans may not care a great deal about equality of results; in fact, they have tolerated 
greater disparities in income and wealth than citizens of any other industrial democracy . . . . 
What they do believe in strongly, however, is equality of opportunity.” (citation omitted)).  
 33. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation 
to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal oppor-
tunity for all of its children.”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“A central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to fur-
ther the national goal of equal opportunity for all our citizens.”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (“Fairness in individual com-
petition for opportunities . . . is a widely cherished American ethic.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 
418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“We deal here with the right of all of our 
children, whatever their race, to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to reach 
their full potential as citizens.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 
(2012); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2011); Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2011); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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tunity is an ideal ingrained in the American psyche.36 What exactly does a 
commitment to equality of opportunity entail? Canvassing the answers to that 
question would be an unforgiving task because the principle is susceptible to 
many, often contradictory, meanings.37 So, instead of defending a particular 
interpretation, I offer a general account that features three views traditionally 
associated with the principle—nondiscrimination, meritocracy, and equal life 
chances. 
1. Nondiscrimination 
Equality of opportunity in its most austere form demands simply that “ca-
reers . . . be open to talents.”38 A product of the Enlightenment, the concept 
was originally directed at the aristocracy’s practice of barring nonaristocrats 
from certain occupations or prestigious positions.39 It has since evolved to re-
quire the elimination of formal barriers to public services, privileges, positions, 
and accommodations based on arbitrary factors such as race, gender, age, disa-
bility, ethnicity, national origin, and sexual orientation—in other words, non-
discrimination.40 
 
 35. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, 
AND THE SOUL OF THE NATION, at xvii (1995). 
 36. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
MERITOCRACY 50 (1999) (describing opportunity for all as “that distinctive national preoc-
cupation”); RAE ET AL., supra note 29, at 64 (noting that equality of opportunity is “the 
most . . . compelling element of our national ideology”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION 139-40 (1993) (suggesting that the Constitution embodies the principle of 
“rough equality of opportunity” and that the principle “was a central theme in the framing 
period”). 
 37. Christopher Jencks, Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational Opportunity to 
Be Equal?, 98 ETHICS 518, 532-33 (1988) (concluding that “most Americans support the 
idea” because “equal opportunity can mean distributing resources either equally or unequal-
ly, . . . it can be compatible with inequalities that favor either the initially advantaged or the 
initially disadvantaged, and [its] relative weight . . . can vary from one situation to the 
next”). Needless to say, the literature on the various interpretations of equality of opportunity 
is voluminous. For a recent discussion, see ANDREW MASON, LEVELLING THE PLAYING FIELD: 
THE IDEA OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND ITS PLACE IN EGALITARIAN THOUGHT (2006).  
 38. Strauss, supra note 29, at 52. For a well-known explication of Napoleon’s maxim 
la carrière ouverte aux talents, see HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 285 n.1 
(Hackett Publ’g Co. photo. reprint 1981) (7th ed. 1907). The phrase was later employed by 
Rawls as part of his exposition of “formal equality of opportunity.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE 66, 72-73 (1971).  
 39. S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 132 (1959). 
 40. Id.; see also JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 1-2 (1998); Strauss, su-
pra note 29, at 52; statutes cited supra note 34. 
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Justifications for the nondiscrimination principle vary depending on what 
is perceived to be wrong with considering arbitrary factors.41 We might find it 
unfair because arbitrary factors are regarded as beyond people’s control.42 Al-
ternatively, we might justify nondiscrimination by focusing on the harm com-
mitted when a person with arbitrary factor X is passed over or excluded due to 
the belief that all persons with X are somehow morally inferior. We might ob-
ject to such discrimination because it projects moral superiority and preju-
dice.43 Instead, we might ground our justification for nondiscrimination on the 
idea that consideration of arbitrary factors is irrational; thus, it would be irra-
tional to deny a person a position on account of, say, race because that factor is 
irrelevant to how well he can perform in the position.44 Notwithstanding the 
differing justifications, nondiscrimination is firmly linked with equality of op-
portunity. 
 
 41. For a description of the various justifications, see Andrew Altman, Discrimination, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 1, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/discrimination/ 
#WroDirDis. 
 42. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (disapproving of discrimination 
on the basis of illegitimacy as arbitrary because, inter alia, it is, “like race or national origin, 
a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual”); 
Altman, supra note 41 (citing RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 54-55 (1996)). But see BERNARD R. BOXILL, BLACKS AND SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 15 (1992) (suggesting that there are situations in which it might be acceptable to 
consider factors beyond individual control); Strauss, supra note 29, at 53-54 (contending that 
there are many factors that might be deemed beyond individual control, including talent). 
 43. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
153-59 (1980); DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 172 (2008); Alt-
man, supra note 41 (citing Patrick S. Shin, The Substantive Principle of Equal Treatment, 15 
LEGAL THEORY 149, 169-70 (2009)); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 
140 (1994) (observing that race or gender discrimination in jury selection risks perpetuation 
of “prejudice” and “invidious group stereotypes”); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (“[T]he fundamental object of Title II [of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964] was to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies 
denials of equal access . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 44. See Altman, supra note 41 (citing ANNE-MARIE MOONEY COTTER, RACE MATTERS: 
AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF RACE DISCRIMINATION 10 (2006)); see also Harry 
Frankfurt, Equality and Respect, 64 SOC. RES. 3, 8, 11-12 (1997); Harry Frankfurt, The Mor-
al Irrelevance of Equality, 14 PUB. AFF. Q. 87, 97, 102-103 (2000); cf. ALAN H. GOLDMAN, 
JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 34 (1979) (arguing that discrimination is wrong be-
cause “the most competent individuals have prima facie rights to positions”). 
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2. Meritocracy 
From “careers open to talents” we derive not only nondiscrimination but 
also the meritocracy view.45 If talent is the determinative factor, then the per-
son with the most talent should obtain the open position. Some argue that a 
meritocratic system maximizes utility, producing many morally desirable out-
comes for society.46 Others propose that meritocracy is grounded in desert, that 
past accomplishments should determine whether one is morally deserving of a 
position.47 Still others think meritocracy preserves respect for persons because 
talents and abilities are constitutive of personhood; when these qualities are dis-
regarded, the person has been insulted and disrespected.48 Although much more 
can be said about each of these positions, I merely wish to point out that meri-
tocracy is compatible with equality of opportunity.49  
Together, nondiscrimination and meritocracy have been said to make the 
competition for careers procedurally fair.50 Rawls deems this “formal equality 
of opportunity,”51 which some contend is the most society can and should pur-
sue.52 Rawls, however, argued that formal equality of opportunity is necessary 
but not sufficient.53 He echoed the egalitarian rallying cry for substantive 
equality of opportunity as a measure of distributive justice. 
3. Equal life chances 
The insufficiency of formal equality of opportunity is frequently illustrated 
by Bernard Williams’s example of a hypothetical society that has been domi-
 
 45. See DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 177 (1999); RAWLS, supra note 
38, at 106 (citing MICHAEL YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 1870-2033: AN ESSAY ON 
EDUCATION AND EQUALITY (1958)).  
 46. See, e.g., Norman Daniels, Merit and Meritocracy, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 206, 207, 
209-10 (1978) (explaining that merit is justified by efficiency and productivity). 
 47. See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN 
SOCIAL FORECASTING 453-54 (1973); JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING 
& DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 55-94 (1970); Fred Feldman, 
Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion, 7 UTILITAS 189, 189 (1995). 
 48. See Andrew Mason, Equality of Opportunity, Old and New, 111 ETHICS 760, 771 
(2001); George Sher, Qualifications, Fairness, and Desert, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 113, 
123-25 (Norman E. Bowie ed., 1988).  
 49. See RICHARD T. LONGORIA, MERITOCRACY AND AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 4 (2009). 
 50. See MASON, supra note 37, at 38. 
 51. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 72 (emphasis added).  
 52. See Daniel Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29 PUB. INT. 29, 53-56, 65 (1972); 
Irving Kristol, About Equality, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1972, at 41, 42, 46. Contra MATT 
CAVANAGH, AGAINST EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (2002). 
 53. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 72-73. 
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nated for generations by a prestigious warrior class selected exclusively from 
wealthy families.54 Eventually, the society decides to reform itself and adopt 
formal equality of opportunity. From that point on, membership in the warrior 
class is determined by an open and fair competition. The wealthy families, 
however, continue to overwhelmingly triumph in the competition over the low-
er classes because the children of the lower classes continue to be undernour-
ished and weak while the children of the wealthy are well nourished and strong. 
So, although the procedure does not permit discrimination and selects the best 
warriors, the conditions under which each class prepares for the competition 
denies the lower classes a meaningful opportunity to succeed.55 In such a case, 
“the supposed equality of opportunity is quite empty—indeed, one may say that 
it does not really exist.”56 Therefore, equality of opportunity seems to demand 
not only a procedurally fair competition but also a meaningful opportunity to 
develop qualifications necessary for success in the competition.  
Combining both conditions would be necessary to achieve what Rawls 
termed “fair equality of opportunity,” such that “those who are at the same lev-
el of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, [will] have 
the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social sys-
tem, that is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born.”57 Fair 
equality of opportunity demands, for example, that 
if Smith and Jones have the same native talent, and Smith is born of wealthy, 
educated parents of a socially favored ethnicity and Jones is born of poor, un-
educated parents of a socially disfavored ethnicity, then if they develop the 
same ambition to become scientists or Wall Street lawyers, they will have the 
same prospects of becoming scientists or Wall Street lawyers . . . .58  
It is this notion of the equal “life prospects”59 or “equal life chances”60 that 
many believe completes the ideal of equality of opportunity.61  
 
 54. BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956-1972, 
at 244-45 (1973).  
 55. Although Williams’s example is fictional, some would argue it parallels conditions 
in many modern democracies that have public and private educational systems. See HARRY 
BRIGHOUSE, JUSTICE 48-49 (2004) (“So, for example, someone who is talented and well born 
will be well rewarded, which will enable him to buy for his less talented child an expensive 
education which will enable him to do better than an equally talented but less well-born 
child . . . .”). See generally YOUNG, supra note 45 (satirizing a meritocracy the rules of which 
are established by dominant elites to retain their privilege while convincing the winners and 
the losers that they deserve their fate despite the inequities inherent in the merit criteria). 
 56. Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
110, 126 (Peter Laslett & W.G. Runciman eds., 1962).  
 57. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 73 (emphasis added). 
 58. Richard Arneson, Equality of Opportunity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 29, 
2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/enries/equal-opportunity. 
 59. See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 301. 
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B. Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity 
On Rawls’s view, attempting to achieve equal life chances would require 
counteracting the effects of morally arbitrary social circumstances, primarily 
class.62 As relevant here, Rawls explained that to implement fair equality of 
opportunity it is essential that society guarantee “equal opportunities of educa-
tion for all.”63 That is, “the government tries to insure equal chances of educa-
tion and culture for persons similarly endowed and motivated either by subsi-
dizing private schools or by establishing a public school system.”64 Either way, 
the education system “should be designed to even out class barriers.”65  
Rawls acknowledged, however, that fair equality of opportunity “can be 
only imperfectly carried out” because of the influence of family life on a 
child’s prospects.66 Government can provide an education system, but it cannot 
possibly match the resources that wealthier parents can spend to improve their 
children’s lives and education. And, even if such extra educational spending 
were prohibited, parental values and preferences “vary considerably from one 
family to another, differentially affecting children’s life prospects in a signifi-
 
 60. FISHKIN, supra note 26, at 32-35; James Fishkin, Liberty Versus Equal Opportuni-
ty, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 32, 37 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1987); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 615 (“[Modern liberals] insist that the life 
prospects of a child born to one family in one part of the country ought not to be radically 
different from those of another child born to another family elsewhere.”).  
 61. See James S. Fishkin, Do We Need a Systematic Theory of Equal Opportunity?, in 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 48, at 15, 18 (“Equal life chances and merit together define 
equal opportunity in the strong sense. Either component without the other is a severe sacri-
fice . . . .”); cf. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 
122-34 (1969) (distinguishing between negative freedom—“freedom from,” inter alia, dis-
crimination, implying formal equality of opportunity—and positive freedom—“freedom to” 
flourish, necessitating a more substantive equality of opportunity).  
 62. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 73. Rawls did not include other social contingencies such 
as race and gender because his “ideal” theory of justice operated in a “well-ordered society 
under favorable conditions” where “gender and race would not specify relevant points of 
view.” See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT §§ 18.5-.6, at 65-66 (Erin 
Kelly ed., 2001). Nevertheless, as others have pointed out, Rawls’s account could be fairly 
extended to include other social factors, particularly assuming unfavorable conditions in a 
society with a history of racial and gender-based injustices. See Norman Daniels, Democrat-
ic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 
241, 249-50 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003) (suggesting that Rawls’s fair equality of opportuni-
ty can address unfair racial and gender-based social practices through public education that 
can minimize their effect on life prospects).  
 63. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 73.  
 64. Id. at 275. 
 65. Id. at 73. Rawls does not say exactly how education is to level class barriers.  
 66. Id. at 74. 
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cant way.”67 As Rawls observed, “[e]ven the willingness to make an effort . . . 
is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances.”68 Numerous 
studies substantiate the differential effects of family life on educational 
achievement.69 Therefore, even if government could establish formal equality 
of opportunity and “fair equality of opportunity underwritten by education for 
all,”70 it cannot assure truly equal life chances without “a systematic sacrifice 
in the autonomy of the family or a systematic achievement of [equality of re-
sults]”71—and either option, most everyone agrees, is unacceptable. 
 A second difficulty with Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity is that it is 
only concerned with the differential effects of social circumstances. But, un-
doubtedly, differences in people’s innate talents and abilities, or so-called natu-
ral endowments, also affect their life chances. Moreover, as Rawls admitted, 
natural endowments are as “equally arbitrary,” from a moral standpoint, as so-
cial circumstances.72 Nevertheless, Rawls regarded natural endowments as a 
“common asset” that should be promoted to benefit society at large.73 So, ra-
ther than fully embrace a “principle of redress” that seeks to eliminate or neu-
tralize the effect of inequalities in natural endowments, Rawls advanced “the 
difference principle.”74  
 
 67. Andrew Mason, Equality of Opportunity and Differences in Social Circumstances, 
54 PHIL. Q. 368, 369 (2004). 
 68. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 74. 
 69. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, 
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); FIONA DEVINE, CLASS PRACTICES: HOW 
PARENTS HELP THEIR CHILDREN GET GOOD JOBS (2004); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., 
INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 
(1972); ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE (2003); 
SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN’S LIFE 
CHANCES (1997); UNEQUAL CHANCES: FAMILY BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
(Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2005); D. Henderson, Contextual Specificity, Discretion and 
Cognitive Socialization: With Special Reference to Language, in 2 CLASS, CODES AND 
CONTROL: APPLIED STUDIES TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 48, 48-53 (Basil Bern-
stein ed., 1973); Nancy E. Hill & Lorraine C. Taylor, Parental School Involvement and 
Children’s Academic Achievement: Pragmatics and Issues, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 161 (2004).  
 70. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 87. 
 71. FISHKIN, supra note 26, at 51. 
 72. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 75. 
 73. Id. at 101. 
 74. Id. at 100-01. Rawls does not reject the principle of redress. Indeed, it is implicit in 
his theory of justice: 
[T]he difference principle gives some weight to the considerations singled out by the princi-
ple of redress . . . [, which] holds that in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine 
equality of opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets 
and to those born into the less favorable social positions.  
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Simply put, the difference principle holds that inequalities, particularly of 
wealth and income, must work to the “greatest benefit of the least advan-
taged.”75 That way, the winners of the natural lottery, those who are blessed 
with socially valued talents and abilities, can benefit “from their good fortune 
only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.”76 In prac-
tice, implementing the difference principle might involve a progressive taxation 
scheme and redistribution to improve the welfare of the least advantaged mem-
bers of society.77 
Essentially, then, fair equality of opportunity is meant to counteract the ef-
fects of social circumstances while the difference principle “mitigates the arbi-
trary effects of [natural endowments].”78 The implications of Rawlsian equality 
of opportunity on education policy comes into focus when understanding the 
interplay between fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. At 
least in his early writings, Rawls thought fair equality of opportunity should be 
“lexically prior” to the difference principle, meaning that fair equality of oppor-
tunity must be satisfied before the difference principle.79 Translating this lexi-
cal priority to the education context would mean that we should prefer a distri-
bution that allocates resources so that equally motivated and talented children 
enjoy equal chances for educational achievement over a distribution that allo-
cates resources in such a way as to benefit the worst-off children.  
Beyond making provision for universal education, government must pro-
vide certain children with educational resources to counteract the effects of ed-
ucationally detrimental social circumstances so that educational achievement is 
solely a function of talent and effort. Once the demands of fair equality of op-
portunity are fulfilled as much as possible, the difference principle regulates the 
 
Id. at 100. Rawls suggests that a principle of redress could be effectuated by providing more 
educational resources to “the less rather than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time 
of life, say the earlier years of school.” Id. at 101. Nevertheless, for Rawls, the principle of 
redress is subordinate to the difference principle. See Daniels, supra note 62, at 251.  
 75. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 83. 
 76. Id. at 101.  
 77. See id. at 275-78; RAWLS, supra note 62, at 161 (“The difference principle might, 
then, roughly be satisfied by raising and lowering this minimum and adjusting the constant 
marginal rate of taxation.”). 
 78. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 74 (emphasis added); see also MASON, supra note 37, at 
87 (“The principle of fair equality of opportunity aims to counteract the effects of differences 
in people’s social circumstances on their access to advantage, whereas the difference princi-
ple is intended to counteract the effects of differences in natural endowments on access to 
advantage.”). 
 79. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 89, 302-03. Rawls later expressed uncertainty about the 
lexical priority. See RAWLS, supra note 62, at 163 n.44 (“Some think that the lexical priori-
ty . . . is too strong . . . . At present I do not know what is best here and simply register my 
uncertainty.”). 
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distribution of educational resources.80 Because it is not a principle of redress, 
the difference principle does not “try to even out handicaps as if all were ex-
pected to compete on a fair basis.”81 Indeed, the difference principle could jus-
tify providing more resources and “giving more attention to the better en-
dowed”—provided that would “improve the long-term expectation of the 
[worst off].”82 Hence, Rawlsian equality of opportunity does not require “any 
compensatory education for the worst-off . . . individual” so long as those with 
similar talent and motivation have the same prospects for educational achieve-
ment.83 
In response to the professed shortcomings of Rawlsian equality of oppor-
tunity, so-called luck egalitarians have proposed a view that doubles down on 
the notion of equal life chances yet esteems personal responsibility.  
C. Luck Egalitarianism 
In recent decades, luck egalitarianism has ascended within the ranks of po-
litical philosophy.84 The theory emerged, in part, to co-opt criticism from con-
servatives and libertarians that egalitarianism was hostile to capitalism, failed 
to hold people responsible for how well they live their lives, and sought to 
compensate the undeserving.85 Although luck egalitarians may differ in belief 
in significant respects,86 they generally share the conviction that inequality is 
 
 80. See Catherine Beattie, Rawls and the Distribution of Education, 7 CAN. J. EDUC., 
no. 3, 1982, at 39, 42. 
 81. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 101. 
 82. Id. Nevertheless, in deciding how to direct resources for education, Rawls cautions 
that the “value of education should not be assessed solely in terms of economic efficiency 
and social welfare,” but also in terms of its role “in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of 
his society and to take part in its affairs” and, in so doing, to build a social basis for self-
respect. Id.  
 83. Richard J. Arneson, Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity, 93 PHIL. STUD. 77, 
82-83 (1999).  
 84. Samuel Scheffler, What Is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 14 (2003); see 
also Jonathan Wolff, Equality: Equality in the History of Political Philosophy, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 611, 620 (George Klosko 
ed., 2011); Nir Eyal, Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice, J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL., Jan. 
2007, at 1, 2. 
 85. Anderson, supra note 16, at 290-91; Nicholas Barry, Reassessing Luck Egalitari-
anism, 70 J. POL. 136, 136-37 (2008). 
 86. Elizabeth Anderson, who coined the phrase luck egalitarianism, identified the fol-
lowing influential luck egalitarian works, see Anderson, supra note 16, at 287-88, 290: 
Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 
(1981) [hereinafter Dworkin, What Is Equality?]; G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitar-
ian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 922-23, 930-31 (1989); Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal 
Opportunity for Welfare, in EQUALITY: SELECTED READINGS, supra note 23, at 229, 231; 
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 71 (1991); JOHN E. ROEMER, A Pragmatic Theo-
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permissible when it derives from people’s voluntary choices but is unjust when 
it is the product of people’s unchosen circumstances or luck.87  
Luck egalitarians distinguish between “brute luck” and “option luck.”88 
Brute luck refers to an outcome (good or bad) that occurs independent of a per-
son’s choice—an outcome that is not reasonably avoidable.89 It is the luck 
traceable to circumstances that lie beyond a person’s control, such as genetic 
inheritance (physical and some personality traits), natural endowments (innate 
talents and abilities), environment (class, schooling, family life, and geogra-
phy), or unforeseen events (accidents and natural disasters). Luck egalitarians 
believe that the victims of bad brute luck deserve compensation, seizing on the 
egalitarian impulse that “it is a bad thing—unjust and unfair—for some to be 
worse off than others through no fault of their own.”90  
Option luck refers to an outcome (good or bad) to which a person deliber-
ately chooses to expose herself.91 In other words, option luck “is a matter of 
how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out.”92 Luck egalitarians think that 
people ought to bear all or some of the cost of the bad option luck for which 
they are responsible.93 
 
ry of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner, in EGALITARIAN PERSPECTIVES: ESSAYS IN 
PHILOSOPHICAL ECONOMICS 179, 179-80 (1994); and PHILLIP VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM 
FOR ALL 127 (1995). Anderson separates the different strands of luck egalitarianism into two 
camps: those advocating equality of welfare (Arneson, Cohen, Roemer, and Nagel) and 
those favoring equality of resources (Dworkin, Rakowski, and Van Parijs). Anderson, supra 
note 16, at 293. It is not entirely clear whether each of these theorists deserves the luck egali-
tarian label. Indeed, Dworkin, who was often regarded as the founder of luck egalitarianism, 
rejected the brand. See Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Luck and Hierarchy, 31 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 190, 192 (2003). Nevertheless, I will adopt the label for the limited purposes of this Ar-
ticle. 
 87. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THEORY 453-54 (Mark Bevir ed., 2010); Scheffler, 
supra note 84, at 5.  
 88. Dworkin originally formulated the brute-luck-option-luck distinction. See 
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 23, at 73-77; Dworkin, What is Equality?, supra 
note 86, at 293-98. Several theorists have since offered modifications to the distinction. See, 
e.g., Lippert-Rasmussen, supra note 25, at 551-57; Michael Otsuka, Luck, Insurance, and 
Equality, 113 ETHICS 40, 45 (2002); Martin E. Sandbu, On Dworkin’s Brute-Luck-Option-
Luck Distinction and the Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism, 3 POL. PHIL. & ECON., 
283, 294-99 (2004). See generally Vallentyne, supra note 25. 
 89. See Nicholas Barry, Defending Luck Egalitarianism, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 89, 90 
(2006); Vallentyne, supra note 25, at 531. 
 90. Larry S. Temkin, Inequality, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 99, 101 (1986). 
 91. See Barry, supra note 89, at 90; Vallentyne, supra note 25, at 531, 533. 
 92. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 23, at 73. 
 93. Compare id. at 74, 287 (arguing that government has no obligation to compensate 
those who suffer bad option luck), with MARC FLEURBAEY, FAIRNESS, RESPONSIBILITY AND 
WELFARE 153 (2008) (contending that justice requires compensation for those who are left 
very badly off by their option luck).  
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Enriched by the choice-luck distinction, luck egalitarianism “[is] some-
times regarded as offering a better interpretation of [equality of opportuni-
ty].”94 Unlike Rawlsian equality of opportunity, luck egalitarianism holds that 
all forms of bad brute luck must be neutralized, not simply mitigated. The theo-
ry “suggests that if we are to take the idea of equality of opportunity seriously, 
we need to neutralize as best we can not only the effects of social class but also 
the effects of the distribution of natural talents and (dis)abilities and other acci-
dents of fortune.”95  
At the point at which social circumstances and natural endowments are 
neutralized, people’s life prospects will be influenced only by their ambitions 
and choices.96 Inequalities resulting from option luck will then be acceptable as 
a product of individual choice and personal responsibility.97 Hence, “luck 
egalitarianism is attractive because it gives an account of what it means to level 
the playing field that goes further than other theories of equality of opportunity, 
but which at the same time aims to hold people accountable for how well their 
lives are going.”98  
Yet, for all of its perceived advantages, luck egalitarianism has as many de-
tractors as disciples.99 I could devote the rest of this Article and others to the 
criticisms of luck egalitarianism, but I will mention only two that seem most 
 
 94. Mason, supra note 37, at 760. 
 95. SAMUEL FREEMAN, Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism, in JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT: ESSAYS ON RAWLSIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 111, 111 (2006). Dworkin consid-
ers Rawlsian equality of opportunity “fraudulent because in a market economy people do not 
have equal opportunity who are less able to produce what others want.” See RONALD 
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 207 (1985). 
 96. Or, as Dworkin put it, the distribution of resources over time among individuals 
must be “ambition-sensitive” and not unfairly “endowment-sensitive.” See DWORKIN, 
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 23, at 89, 108. 
 97. Equality of results is not desired. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 291 (“[L]uck 
egalitarians have moved from an equality of outcome to an equality of opportunity concep-
tion of justice: they ask only that people . . . start off with an equal share of resources. But 
they accept the justice of whatever inequalities result from adults’ voluntary choices.” (cita-
tion omitted)); see also Cohen, supra note 86, at 908 (“[T]he primary egalitarian impulse is 
to extinguish the influence . . . of both exploitation and brute luck.”). 
 98. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 87, at 454; see also KOK-CHOR 
TAN, JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONS, AND LUCK: THE SITE, GROUND, AND SCOPE OF EQUALITY 91 
(2012) (“Recognized as the more complex idea that persons presumed as moral equals are 
entitled to equal life chances unless personal choice and not luck dictates otherwise, luck 
egalitarianism is in this sense capable of providing a grounding for the egalitarian default as 
well as specifying what egalitarianism is, what equality should aim for.”); Barry, supra note 
89, at 90 (“[L]uck egalitarianism targets directly the key source of inequality in the world 
today whilst respecting the idea of individual choice.”).  
 99. Zofia Stemplowska, Luck Egalitarianism, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 389, 393 (Gerald Gaus & Fred D’Agostino eds., 2013).  
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relevant to the equality-adequacy debate because they do not apply with equal 
force to adequacy-based theories.  
First, critics charge that the distinction between brute luck and option luck 
is tenuous because “people’s voluntary choices are routinely influenced by un-
chosen features of their personalities, temperaments, and the social contexts in 
which they find themselves.”100 If our choices can be shaped by features that 
are largely a matter of brute luck, then is it appropriate to regard them as within 
our control? If Michael’s parents are apathetic about his education or are unable 
to provide him the resources and conditions to cultivate any academic interests, 
then is it fair to hold Michael responsible for his lack of effort and ambition?  
Some luck egalitarians think that people should indeed be held responsible 
for such factors because the brute-luck-option-luck “distinction tracks ordinary 
people’s ethical experience. Ordinary people, in their ordinary lives, take con-
sequential responsibility for their own personalities.”101 Other luck egalitarians 
acknowledge that there are some preferences that are beyond our control and 
must therefore fall on the brute-luck side of the equation.102 But, of course, that 
view prompts a further inquiry: is it practical or even possible to separate pref-
erences that are and are not influenced by external forces? Needless to say, am-
biguities about the concept of choice deployed by luck egalitarians provoke 
deep metaphysical questions about free will and personal identity.103 
Second, luck egalitarianism has been accused of betraying the egalitarian 
axiom of equal respect. Specifically, Anderson and others assert that luck egali-
tarianism permits expressions of pity to be directed at the victims of bad brute 
luck who “lay claim to [compensation] in virtue of their inferiority to others, 
not in virtue of their equality to others.”104 That is, luck egalitarianism is said 
to force the victim of bad brute luck “to look inward in deciding whether she 
 
100. Scheffler, supra note 84, at 18.  
101. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 23, at 289-90. 
102. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Expensive Taste Rides Again, in DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS: 
WITH REPLIES BY DWORKIN 3, 8 (Justine Burley ed., 2004); Cohen, supra note 86, at 934. 
103. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, EQUALITY AND TRADITION: QUESTIONS OF VALUE IN 
MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 217-19 (2010) (claiming that the conception of choice em-
ployed by luck egalitarians depends on a libertarian understanding of choice and offering an 
alternative metaphysical view of choice); Marc Fleurbaey, Egalitarian Opportunities, 20 
LAW & PHIL. 499 (2001). 
104. Anderson, supra note 16, at 306; cf. Jonathan Wolff, Fairness, Respect and the 
Egalitarian Ethos, 27 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 97, 113-15 (1998) (suggesting that conditioning 
compensation on evidence of bad brute luck forces the misfortunate to reveal shameful in-
formation about their lack of innate talent and abilities in order to “make out a convincing 
case that one is a failure,” a self-awareness that is “demeaning and also undermining of self-
respect”). 
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has a legitimate claim on fellow citizens” and thereby view her bad brute luck 
as constitutive of her identity.105  
There is some empirical support for the notion that many people attribute 
instances of bad brute luck—for example, poverty—to personal failings or de-
fects.106 In the education context, studies have suggested that “pull-out” pro-
grams, which target disadvantaged students for compensatory aid, stigmatize 
those students.107 Even when efforts are made to make it harder to distinguish 
students in that regard, stigmatization persists.108 Moreover, teacher expecta-
tions of students marked as “educationally disadvantaged” are lower, and, per-
haps consequently, so is student performance.109 
Luck egalitarians have offered various responses to the equal-respect criti-
cism, reiterating that their theories are motivated by equal concern and respect, 
not pity.110 Undoubtedly, luck egalitarians are committed to showing “recogni-
 
105. Scheffler, supra note 84, at 18, 21; see also Elizabeth Anderson, Reply to Com-
mentators on What Is the Point of Equality?, BROWN U. (Dec. 22, 1999), 
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9912ande.html (critiquing luck egali-
tarianism as “express[ing] pity and disrespect for the less fortunate”). 
106. See, e.g., Lauren D. Appelbaum et al., When Effort Is Threatening: The Influence 
of the Belief in a Just World on Americans’ Attitudes Toward Antipoverty Policy, 27 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 387, 390 (2006) (explaining beliefs in “a just world” in which “people get what 
they deserve and deserve what they get”); Heather E. Bullock, Attributions for Poverty: A 
Comparison of Middle-Class and Welfare Recipient Attitudes, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
2059, 2060 (1999) (concluding that most Americans hold individualist explanations of pov-
erty, which “focus on how poor people themselves are responsible for their poverty” because 
of negative personal qualities); Christina Fong, Social Preferences, Self-Interest, and the 
Demand for Redistribution, 82 J. PUB. ECON. 225, 232-33 (2001) (finding that high-income 
respondents were more likely to think self-determination rather than luck causes poverty); 
Susan J. Popkin, Welfare: Views from the Bottom, 37 SOC. PROBS. 64, 72 (1990) (observing 
that negative views of welfare recipients include feelings of shame). 
107. See Kenneth K. Wong & Stephen J. Meyer, Title I Schoolwide Programs: A Syn-
thesis of Findings from Recent Evaluation, 20 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 115, 
115 (1998) (citing GENE V. GLASS & MARY LEE SMITH, UNIV. OF COLO. LAB. FOR EDUC. 
RESEARCH, “PULL OUT” IN COMPENSATORY EDUCATION (1977)).  
108. See Sandra J. Stein, “These Are Your Title I Students”: Policy Language in Educa-
tional Practice, 34 POL’Y SCI. 135, 144 (2001) (“Students eligible for Title I are seen as out-
side of [the middle-class] norm, different, and deficient before they arrive at school.”). 
109. Id. at 150; see SANDRA J. STEIN, THE CULTURE OF EDUCATION POLICY 22-23 
(2004). 
110. See TAN, supra note 98, at 129 (“The [luck egalitarian] guarantee to all persons of 
their legitimate entitlement is a mark of equal respect, not disrespect or contempt.”); Richard 
J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism, 110 ETHICS 339, 344 (2000) (“One 
expresses due respect for persons and treats them respectfully by acting toward persons in 
accordance with the moral principles that are best supported by reasons.”); Barry, supra note 
89, at 97 (“Rather than disparaging or pitying the unlucky, the whole point of luck egalitari-
anism is that inequalities reflecting brute bad luck are unjust, illegitimate and unaccepta-
ble.”); Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue Revisited, 113 ETHICS 106, 116-17 (2002) (ex-
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tion respect” to the victims of bad brute luck, meaning that they “give proper 
weight to the fact that they are persons” worthy of equal life chances and self-
respect.111 But perhaps Anderson and other critics worry that luck egalitarian-
ism, as applied, deprives those with bad brute luck of “appraisal respect,” ex-
pressed to persons with manifested characteristics that make them deserving of 
positive appraisal.112  
Although appraisal respect “is not owed to everyone, for it may or may not 
be merited,”113 the converse is surely true as well: the victims of bad brute luck 
do not deserve negative evaluations of personal features that they cannot con-
trol. The danger is that negative assessments erode “attitudes which one can 
bear to oneself”—not only appraisal self-respect (i.e., self-esteem) but also 
recognition self-respect, that is, the self-valuation of “the rights and responsibil-
ities of being a person.”114  
The Finnish comprehensive-school model suggests one possible solution to 
this dilemma: take the “special” out of special education by subjecting most 
students at one point or another to remedial educational services.115 As ex-
plained in Part III, by incorporating vertical equity principles while maintaining 
high adequacy thresholds, this approach can resemble both equality and ade-
quacy. 
Before exploring that possibility, let us assess how the Rawlsian and luck 
egalitarian versions of equality of opportunity have been expressed in education 
law and policy in the United States. 
 
plaining that the redistribution of resources that he advocates is based precisely on respect 
and concern for those who have not had a fair opportunity to protect themselves from bad 
luck); Thomas Christiano, Commentary on What Is the Point of Equality?, BROWN U. (July 
22, 1999), http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9904chri.html (contending 
that Anderson’s critique “miscast[s] the [luck] egalitarian position” that those with inferior 
talents and abilities simply have “less with which to pursue a decent life” and that this “is in 
no way incompatible with the idea of equality of respect and concern”).  
111. See Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 39 (1977). 
112. See id. at 38-39. 
113. Id. at 45. 
114. See id. at 47; see also THOMAS E. HILL, JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 19 
(1991) (“A person may lack self-respect not merely by underestimating his merits and 
achievements but also by misunderstanding and undervaluing his equal rights as a human 
being.”). 
115. Pasi Sahlberg, A Model Lesson: Finland Shows Us What Equal Opportunity Looks 
Like, AM. EDUCATOR, Spring 2012, at 20, 24 (2012) (“[Because] up to half of those students 
who complete their compulsory education [in Finland] have been in special education at 
some point in their schooling[,] it is nothing special anymore for students. This fact signifi-
cantly reduces the negative stigma that is often brought on by special education.”).  
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D. Equality of Educational Opportunity 
1. The historical and legal perspectives  
 Proponents of equality of educational opportunity tend to exalt the declara-
tion in Brown v. Board of Education that “the opportunity of an educa-
tion . . . . is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”116 
Ironically enough, the Supreme Court’s first inclination toward the ideal came 
in the infamous opinion Brown overruled, Plessy v. Ferguson: “When the gov-
ernment, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the 
law and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished 
the end for which it was organized and performed all of the functions respect-
ing social advantages with which it is endowed.”117  
The Plessy Court basically regarded the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause as requiring nominal forms of political equality and formal 
equality of opportunity.118 In reality, of course, African Americans were denied 
basic rights of citizenship, “separate but equal” was inherently discriminatory, 
and virtually no one at the time considered African Americans better qualified 
than whites in any respect.119  
It would take another half century for the Court to fully realize the hypocri-
sy of the ideal of equality of opportunity to which Plessy gave lip service.120 
Although the 1954 Brown decision declared that education “must be made 
available to all on equal terms,” its holding legally invalidated only one aspect 
of discriminatory education policy—state-sanctioned racial segregation.121 
Emboldened by Brown, however, “scholars and advocates began turning their 
attention” to another form of discrimination—“unequal school funding.”122 Ini-
 
116. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
117. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (quoting People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 
448 (1883)) (emphasis added), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
118. See Kathryn Abrams, The Legal Subject in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 27, 47 n.62 (2001); 
Daniel Gordon, Happy Anniversary Brown v. Board of Education: In Need of a Remake Af-
ter Forty Years?, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107, 109-10 (1993). 
119. See Daniel R. Gordon, One Hundred Years After Plessy: The Failure of Democra-
cy and the Potentials for Elitist and Neutral Anti-Democracy, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 641, 
658-59 (1996). 
120. For a discussion of the development of the ideal of equality of educational oppor-
tunity before Brown, see Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity by the Numbers: 
The Warren Court’s Empirical Legacy, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1312-16 (2002). 
121. For several years following Brown, the Supreme Court upheld comprehensive de-
segregation plans. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 269 (1969); 
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  
122. William S. Koski & Jesse Hahnel, The Past, Present, and Possible Futures of Ed-
ucational Finance Reform Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE 
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tially, progress was made on the legislative front with the passage of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),123 and, specifically, 
Title I of the Act, which provided compensatory aid for low-income chil-
dren.124 Even when properly allocated and spent, however, Title I assistance 
was insufficient to reduce vast disparities between wealthy and poor school dis-
tricts funded primarily through local property taxes.125 Equality of educational 
opportunity activists thus began to seek remedies in the courts. 
During what is commonly called the first wave of school finance litigation 
(late 1960s-1973), when funding schemes were challenged as violating the U.S. 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, the early reform theories sounded in 
formal equality of opportunity. Equality of educational opportunity meant 
simply nondiscrimination: students should not be discriminated against based 
on their school district’s wealth.126 That legal theory gained traction when a 
few lower courts held that school finance schemes violated federal and/or state 
equal protection guarantees by discriminating “against the poor” in making “the 
quality of a child’s education a function of the wealth of his parents and neigh-
bors.”127 But the theory derailed at the federal level when the Supreme Court 
ruled in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez that education 
was not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution and that strict scrutiny 
did not apply because those who reside in poor school districts did not consti-
 
AND POLICY 42, 43 (Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske eds., 2008); see also Heise, supra 
note 120, at 1325. 
123. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.).  
124. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7372 (2012). The stated intent of Title I was to “provide fi-
nancial assistance . . . to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of 
children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by 
various means . . . which contribute particularly to meeting the . . . needs of educationally 
deprived children.” Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, sec. 201, § 239, 79 
Stat. 27, 27. 
125. See Black, supra note 4, at 1358; Anita F. Hill, A History of Hollow Promises: 
How Choice Jurisprudence Fails to Achieve Educational Equality, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
107, 121-22 (2006). 
126. See Koski & Hahnel, supra note 122, at 45. 
127. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); see Van Dusartz v. 
Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971) (holding that Minnesota’s school financing 
system of making “spending per pupil a function of the school district’s wealth violates the 
equal protection guarantee of the 14th Amendment”); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457, 
469-72 (Mich. 1972) (treating wealth as a suspect classification and holding that Michigan’s 
school financing system violated the equal protection guarantees of the state constitution); 
Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.) (concluding that New Jer-
sey’s school financing system “discriminates against pupils in districts with low real proper-
ty wealth . . . [and] discriminates against taxpayers by imposing unequal burdens for a com-
mon state purpose,” thereby contravening the federal and state constitutions), supplemented, 
289 A.2d 569 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), modified, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
WEISHART 66 STAN. L. REV. XX - PRODUCTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/2014 8:22 PM 
March 2014] TRANSCENDING EQUALITY VS. ADEQUACY 501 
tute a suspect class for equal protection purposes.128 Moreover, the 5-4 majori-
ty found that the funding disparities in question were rationally related to the 
preservation of “local control” over school districts—a “vital” interest worth 
“some inequality.”129 
Eschewing Rodriguez’s interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, plaintiffs 
resorted to the education clauses and equal protection provisions of their state 
constitutions.130 During this second wave (1973-1989), the focus was still for-
mal equality of educational opportunity—“to achieve either horizontal equity 
among school districts, such that per-pupil revenues were roughly equalized by 
the state, or at least fiscal neutrality, such that the revenues available to a school 
district would not depend solely on the property wealth of the school dis-
trict.”131 And several state courts discerned the arbitrariness of allowing educa-
tional opportunities to be dictated, in part, by the school district in which a stu-
dent happened to reside.132 Although plaintiffs prevailed in only seven of the 
 
128. 411 U.S. 1, 28, 35 (1973). 
129. Id. at 49-51 (quoting Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 478 (1972) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Deference to local control also helped dismantle desegregation ef-
forts. See Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW. L.J. 705, 718-19 (2004). 
130. For a collection of state education clauses and equal protection provisions, see R. 
CRAIG WOOD & DAVID C. THOMPSON, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS—AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 111-32 (2d ed. 1996); An-
na Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy Debate: Implications for Rural 
School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 133, 150 n.62 (2003); and Underwood, 
supra note 3, at 511 n.101. 
131. Koski & Hahnel, supra note 122, at 47; see Ryan & Saunders, supra note 4, at 
466. Under the fiscal neutrality approach, developed by John E. Coons, William H. Clune 
III, and Stephen D. Sugarman, all school districts would have access to the same amount of 
school funding, but the exact level of expenditures would depend on the tax rates adopted in 
the school districts. See JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 
201-02 (1970). 
132. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (“[T]he ed-
ucational opportunity of the children in this state should not be controlled by the fortuitous 
circumstance of residence . . . . Such a system only promotes greater opportunities for the 
advantaged while diminishing the opportunities for the disadvantaged.”); Serrano v. Priest 
(Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976) (“Substantial disparities in expenditures per pu-
pil among school districts cause and perpetuate substantial disparities in the quality and ex-
tent of availability of educational opportunities. For this reason the school financing system 
before the court fails to provide equality of treatment to all the pupils in the state.”); Horton 
v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977) (“The discrimination is relative rather than ab-
solute. Further, the children living in towns with relatively low assessable property values 
are afforded public education but, as the trial court found, the education they receive is to a 
substantial degree narrower and lower in quality than that which pupils receive in compara-
ble towns with a larger tax base and greater ability to finance education.”); Helena Elemen-
tary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989) (“[S]pending disparities 
among the State’s school districts translate into a denial of equality of educational opportuni-
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twenty-two second-wave decisions, they succeeded in obtaining greater per-
pupil spending equity across districts in those states that had their school fi-
nancing systems overturned.133 But, in some cases, the greater equity arguably 
came at a high cost—the leveling down of education spending overall.134 
The third wave of school finance litigation (1989-present) was triggered by 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision that the state’s “entire system of 
common schools [was] unconstitutional.”135 The court concluded that signifi-
cant inadequacies in educational opportunities violated the state constitution’s 
education clause, which required the state legislature to “provide for an effi-
cient system of common schools throughout the State.”136 Although the court 
discussed the impact of funding inequalities, it resolved the case by obligating 
the state legislature to provide all students with an “adequate” education.137 
According to traditional accounts, the Kentucky decision, along with similar 
 
ty.”); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) 
(“[D]istricts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar lev-
els of tax effort. Children who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts 
must be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds.”); 
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (“[A]ny discriminatory classification 
found in the educational financing system cannot stand unless the State can demonstrate 
some compelling State interest to justify the unequal classification.”); Washakie Cnty. Sch. 
Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980) (“The respective tax bases of the 
school districts of this state and their per-student resources reflect discordant correlations 
which plainly demonstrate the failure of the current system to provide equal educational op-
portunity.”). 
133. See William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandated School Finance Re-
form, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 72, 75-
98 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999); Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legisla-
tive vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 
1030 & n.45, 1031 (2006) (estimating that plaintiffs in second-wave cases “were successful 
only about one-third of the time” but noting that counts of plaintiff victories vary because 
they “are inherently difficult and somewhat subjective” and, moreover, that successful suits 
nevertheless “encouraged plaintiffs in other states to challenge their systems of school fi-
nance”). 
134. See Koski & Hahnel, supra note 122, at 47 (citing conflicting studies); see also 
Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in the 1990s, in 
EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 133, 
at 136, 145-46 (citing a 1978 study that found that eight of eleven states that had enacted 
significant school funding reforms in the 1970s along with significant property tax relief saw 
per-pupil expenditures fall relative to the national average); Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, 
Broken Duties: A New Theory for School Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1205 
(2011) (“[T]he lesson from California is that even if school funding is equalized, the equity 
theory does nothing to prevent a state from ‘leveling down’ school funding to some equally 
insufficient amount.”). 
135. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).  
136. KY. CONST. § 183. 
137. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
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decisions that same year in Montana and Texas,138 turned the tide, suggesting 
to plaintiffs in other states that they could prevail by seeking adequate, instead 
of equal, educational opportunities based on their state constitutions’ education 
clauses.139 I will return to the adequacy movement in Part II. For now, it should 
be understood that plaintiffs continued to pursue, and some courts continued to 
invoke, equality of educational opportunity “deep into the third wave.”140 
Even before the third wave, however, advocates and courts had recognized 
the limitations of formal equality of educational opportunity through horizontal 
equity or fiscal neutrality.141 Attempting to equalize funding across districts did 
not directly address the educational needs of disadvantaged students, who en-
tered the schoolhouse door already on unequal footing. Hence, many of the 
same courts that demanded greater funding equity also acknowledged that the 
state could (and probably should) account for the different “costs associated 
with providing an equalized educational opportunity to . . . disadvantaged stu-
dents.”142 Paralleling the lessons from Bernard Williams’s warrior class hypo-
 
138. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989); 
Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989). 
139. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance 
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 603-04 (1994); 
Thro, supra note 18, at 221-22; Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Fi-
nance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 520-35 (1991); 
Gail F. Levine, Note, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial 
School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 507-08 (1991). 
140. Ryan & Saunders, supra note 4, at 467, 468 & n.35 (citing cases utilizing the 
equality-of-educational-opportunity approach into the third movement). 
141. See Walter I. Garms & Mark C. Smith, Educational Need and Its Application to 
State School Finance, 3 J. HUM. RESOURCES 304, 305 (1970) (“The realization is coming 
gradually that even if state aid programs were to distribute money to school districts in such 
a way that all districts would have an equal expenditure per pupil with equal local tax effort, 
we would still not be guaranteeing equality of educational opportunity.”); Koski & Hahnel, 
supra note 122, at 44 (observing that even one of the early architects of horizontal equity, 
Arthur Wise, found it unsatisfying). 
142. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 398; see Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976) 
(“[A]n equal expenditure level per pupil in every district is not educationally sound or desir-
able because of differing educational needs . . . .”); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 376 
(Conn. 1977) (“Logically, the state may recognize differences in educational costs based on 
relevant economic and educational factors and on course offerings of special interest in di-
verse communities. None of the basic alternative plans to equalize the ability of various 
towns to finance education requires that all towns spend the same amount for the education 
of each pupil.”); Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 336 (Wyo. 
1980) (“We hold that exact or absolute equality is not required. There must be allowance for 
variances in individuals, groups and local conditions.”); see also Robinson v. Cahill, 303 
A.2d 273, 297-98 (N.J. 1973) (“Although we have dealt with the constitutional problem in 
terms of dollar input per pupil, we should not be understood to mean that the State may not 
recognize differences in area costs, or a need for additional dollar input to equip classes of 
disadvantaged children for the educational opportunity.”).  
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thetical, some courts recognized that, because “education is a major determi-
nant of an individual’s chances for economic and social success in our competi-
tive society,”143 states had a duty to provide “that educational opportunity 
which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a 
citizen and as a competitor in the labor market.”144 Otherwise, the right to edu-
cational opportunities would be “hollow indeed if the possessor of the right 
could not compete adequately.”145 Or, in the words of one dissenting judge, 
“the phrase ‘equal opportunities,’ in practical terms, means substantially equal 
opportunities.”146 
Despite the apparent recognition that horizontal equity and fiscal neutrality 
are insufficient, the evolution to substantive equality of educational opportuni-
ty—or “vertical equity,” as it became known—has been gradual.147 In the 
1960s, the “war on poverty”148 jumpstarted the effort with the ESEA and its 
subsequent amendments, which directed funding to low-income, disabled, and 
limited English proficient (LEP) students. The ESEA was followed by the 
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA)149 and the Education for 
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, later renamed the Individuals with Dis-
 
143. Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-56 (Cal. 1971); see also id. at 1257 (“Unequal ed-
ucation . . . leads to unequal job opportunities, disparate income, and handicapped ability to 
participate in the social, cultural, and political activity of our society.” (quoting S.F. Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 479 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. 
DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (“Education becomes the 
essential prerequisite that allows our citizens to be able to appreciate, claim and effectively 
realize their established rights.”); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979) (“[A] 
thorough and efficient system of schools . . . develops, as best the state of education exper-
tise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful 
and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically.”). 
144. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295; see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 
94 (Wash. 1978) (“[T]he State’s constitutional duty goes beyond mere reading, writing and 
arithmetic. It also embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary set-
ting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors in today’s 
market as well as in the market place of ideas.” (citing Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295)). 
145. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 94. 
146. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 263 (N.C. 1997) (Orr, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part); see also Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (Vt. 1997) (concluding 
that Vermont has an obligation to “ensure substantial equality of educational opportunity”). 
147. See ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL 
FINANCE: CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS (1984) (presenting 
a seminal analysis of three economic measures of equity in school finance—horizontal equi-
ty, vertical equity, and equal opportunity); Ryan & Saunders, supra note 4, at 469 (“Despite 
its promise, the movement toward vertical equity has been slow.”). 
148. See Annual Message to Congress: The Economic Report of the President, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 155, 164 (Jan. 20, 1964); Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 
1 PUB. PAPERS 112, 114 (Jan. 8, 1964). 
149. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1228, 1701-
1758 (2012)). 
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abilities Education Act (IDEA).150 Those laws established rights for LEP stu-
dents and children with disabilities to remedial educational resources. Signifi-
cantly, the EEOA also codified the “policy of the United States that . . . all 
children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational opportunity 
without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin.”151 
Meanwhile, state courts in the early and mid-1980s were inclined to uphold 
school finance schemes and give deference to the legislative process.152 Never-
theless, vertical equity regained momentum in the 1990s and early 2000s when 
the supreme courts of four states—New Jersey, Wyoming, North Carolina, and 
Kansas—incorporated vertical equity principles.153 The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, for instance, determined that the state’s education clause obligated the 
legislature not only “to assure that poorer urban districts’ educational funding is 
substantially equal to that of property-rich districts” but also to provide addi-
tional funding “for the special educational needs of these poorer urban districts 
and address their extreme disadvantages.”154 The court later found the legisla-
ture’s supplemental aid program inadequate because, among other reasons, it 
was based on a “model district” that failed to “provide the special and extra-
 
150. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.). 
151. 20 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012) (emphasis added). When the EEOA legislation was in-
troduced in 1972, President Richard Nixon called upon the nation to provide “equal educa-
tional opportunity to every person,” including the many “poor” and minority children long 
“doomed to inferior education” as well as those “who start their education under language 
handicaps.” Educational Opportunity and Busing: The President’s Address to the Nation 
Outlining His Proposals, 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 590, 591 (Mar. 16, 1972). 
152. Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name 
of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN 
EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 133, at 34, 55.  
153. See Preston C. Green, III et al., Race-Conscious Funding Strategies and School 
Finance Litigation, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 65-67, 69-70 (2006) (discussing decisions of 
the supreme courts of New Jersey, Wyoming, Kansas, and North Carolina); Ryan & Saun-
ders, supra note 4, at 469-70 (discussing, in addition to New Jersey and North Carolina court 
decisions, a Maryland case resolved in a settlement agreement that resulted in “supplemental 
funding for at-risk students” and precipitated the state’s “new funding formula weighted to 
provide twice the normal amount of funding for poor, disabled, and Limited English Profi-
ciency students”).  
154. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990). As foreseen in the Ab-
bott II decision, New Jersey had to later grapple with the disadvantages faced by poor stu-
dents in its rural school districts. See Kyle E. Gruber, Bringing Home the Bacon: A Case for 
Applying the New Jersey Urban School Funding Remedy from Abbott v. Burke to Poor Ru-
ral School Districts, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 167, 185-91 (2012). 
For informative discussions of the unique challenges facing rural poor students, see 
John Dayton, Rural Children, Rural Schools, and Public School Funding Litigation: A Real 
Problem in Search of a Real Solution, 82 NEB. L. REV. 99 (2003); and Shavers, supra note 
130. Cf. Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, 
Child Poverty and Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
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educational programs and services required” for disadvantaged children to take 
equal advantage of educational opportunity.155 The Supreme Court of Kansas 
made similar findings with respect to its school financing formula.156  
Encapsulating the contemporary egalitarian mandate for equal life chances, 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming proclaimed: 
 An equal opportunity for a proper education necessarily contemplates the 
playing field will be leveled so each child has an equal chance for educational 
success. Educational success must be defined as graduating from high school 
equipped for a role as a citizen, participant in the political system and com-
petitor both intellectually and economically. . . .  
 Children with an impaired readiness to learn do not have the same equal 
opportunity for a quality education as do those children not impacted by per-
sonal or social ills simply because they do not have the same starting point in 
learning. A legislatively created finance system which distributes dollars 
without regard for the need to level the playing field does not provide an equal 
opportunity for a quality education.157 
More recently, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB),158 which 
reauthorized the ESEA, was enacted “to ensure that all children have a fair, 
equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education.”159 One 
of the NCLB’s stated purposes is to close “the achievement gap between high- 
and low-performing children, especially the achievement gaps between minori-
ty and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged children and their 
more advantaged peers.”160 Congress aimed to achieve that goal by, among 
other things, “distributing and targeting resources sufficiently to make a differ-
 
155. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 431 (N.J. 1997). 
156. Montoy v. State, 102 P.3d 1160, 1164 (Kan. 2005) (“[T]he district court found that 
the financing formula was not based upon actual costs to educate children but was instead 
based on former spending levels and political compromise. This failure to do any cost analy-
sis distorted the low enrollment, special education, vocational, bilingual education, and the 
at-risk student weighting factors. . . . [T]here is substantial competent evidence to support the 
district court’s findings . . . .”). 
157. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1278-79 (Wyo. 1995) (citation 
omitted); see also Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 397 (N.C. 2004) (“The 
world economy and technological advances of the twenty-first century mandate the necessity 
that the State step forward, boldly and decisively, to see that all children, without regard to 
their socio-economic circumstances, have an educational opportunity and experience that not 
only meet the constitutional mandates . . . but fulfill the dreams and aspirations of the found-
ers of our state and nation. Assuring that our children are afforded the chance to become 
contributing, constructive members of society is paramount. Whether the State meets this 
challenge remains to be determined.”). 
158. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 20 U.S.C.). 
159. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012) (emphasis added). 
160. Id. § 6301(3). 
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ence to local educational agencies and schools where needs are greatest.”161 As 
part of the NCLB’s accountability system, schools are also required to dis-
aggregate data on adequate yearly progress (AYP) for “economically disadvan-
taged students,” “students from major racial and ethnic groups,” “students with 
disabilities,” and “students with limited English proficiency.”162 Although, in 
reality, the NCLB demands only modest educational adequacy, as explained 
below, it nevertheless reinforces vertical-equity principles by affirming the ide-
al that all children are entitled to an “equal” education and by including provi-
sions that target the disadvantaged. 
Accordingly, the ideal of equality of educational opportunity arising from 
these legislative and judicial incorporations of vertical equity principles is that  
all students should have an equal chance to succeed, with actual observed suc-
cess dependent on certain personal characteristics, such as motivation, desire, 
effort, and to some extent ability . . . [, and not] on circumstances outside the 
control of the child, such as the financial position of the family, geographic lo-
cation, ethnic or racial identity, gender, and disability.163 
Such a conception is in one sense more demanding than Rawlsian equality 
of opportunity. Recall that Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity entails some 
degree of compensatory education to counteract the differential effects of une-
qual social circumstances, particularly class barriers, so that those with the 
same level of talent and motivation face the same prospects. But it does not re-
quire additional compensatory education to neutralize the unequal distribution 
of natural endowments; there is no obligation to ensure, for instance, that the 
less talented enjoy the same chances for success as the more talented. Rather, 
those blessed by nature are to profit from their natural endowments so long as 
the resulting inequalities work to the greatest benefit of the less talented. If that 
outcome can be achieved by providing additional educational opportunities to 
the more talented, then, in keeping with the difference principle, so be it.  
By contrast, lawmakers construing equality of educational opportunity 
have apportioned additional resources to compensate directly for natural ine-
qualities, without first assessing whether fair equality of opportunity obtains or 
whether the compensation accords with the difference principle.164 Conse-
quently, their conception incorporates the principle of redress—“undeserved 
 
161. Id. § 6301(5). 
162. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II). 
163. Robert Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School Finance Equity: 1970 to the 
Present, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, su-
pra note 133, at 7, 13. 
164. See Harry Brighouse, Educational Equality and School Reform, in EDUCATIONAL 
EQUALITY 15, 29 (Graham Haydon ed., 2010) (“[The U.S.] education system expends far 
more resources per pupil on children with disabilities than on children who are socially dis-
advantaged; in fact, social disadvantage gives a student no claim to extra resources . . . 
whereas ‘natural’ disadvantage does.”). 
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inequalities . . . of birth and natural endowment . . . are to be somehow com-
pensated for”165—which Rawls did not fully endorse.  
Although equality of educational opportunity as it has been conceived and 
applied is theoretically more ambitious than Rawlsian equality of opportunity, 
it is not quite the educational analogue of luck egalitarianism. Despite the rhet-
oric that “all children” deserve “equal” chances for educational achievement, 
lawmakers have not sought to neutralize all forms of bad brute luck. In prac-
tice, the objective has instead been to mitigate rather than neutralize the differ-
ential effects of natural and social inequalities. Indeed, it might be too generous 
to suggest that mitigation is the actual goal given the relatively modest com-
mitment of government resources to high-poverty school districts. Although 
public education is often the largest appropriation in state budgets, funding dis-
parities between high- and low-poverty school districts persist,166 even in states 
in which courts have mandated full funding.167 Part of the problem is the grow-
ing reluctance of state courts to continue to supervise school finance cases and 
consistently intervene in budgetary considerations thought properly reserved 
for the political branches, especially during times of economic downturn.168 
Moreover, some of the courts that have invoked educational “equality” have 
meant “an equal opportunity to have an adequate education.”169 
 
165. See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 100. 
166. See Rebell, supra note 6, at 1476-79; see also BRUCE D. BAKER & SEAN P. 
CORCORAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE STEALTH INEQUITIES OF SCHOOL FUNDING: HOW 
STATE AND LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS PERPETUATE INEQUITABLE STUDENT SPENDING 
51-52, 85-86 (2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/09/StealthInequities.pdf; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A STRATEGY FOR EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 
15 (2013), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/eec/equity-excellence-
commission-report.pdf (recognizing that America “spend[s] as much as or even more as a 
share of [its] GDP than do other nations” on education but observing “that schools in poor 
communities spend less per pupil—and often many thousands of dollars less per pupil—than 
schools in nearby affluent communities”). 
167. See Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State Constitutional 
Imperative, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 776-80 (2009). 
168. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 155 (concluding that, because state legislatures are 
loath to increase funding or redistribute it, “courts would have to be quite aggressive and re-
main actively engaged in school funding litigation, over a long period of time, if interested in 
truly equalizing access to funding” but recognizing that “[f]ew courts have shown such zeal 
or commitment”); Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic Education in 
Times of Fiscal Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1886-96 (2012); Reynolds, supra note 
167, at 763-66. 
169. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) (emphasis 
added); see also Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 428 (N.J. 1997) (defining “a constitutionally ade-
quate education” (emphasis added)); Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 396 
(N.C. 2004) (concluding that the State had failed in its “constitutional duty to provide . . . 
students with the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education”). 
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At the federal level, the NCLB aims for all students to have an “equal . . . 
opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, profi-
ciency on challenging State academic achievement standards and state academ-
ic assessments.”170 Obtaining “a high-quality education” and reaching “profi-
ciency” do not necessitate that all children have equal chances for educational 
achievement. Similarly, although the IDEA directs remedial resources to stu-
dents with disabilities, it guarantees them only a “free appropriate public edu-
cation”—not chances for educational success equal to that of their nondisabled 
peers.171  
Still, I presume that the equality faithful are committed to the ideal implicit 
in some federal and state law, which can be satisfied only by neutralizing most, 
if not all, natural and social disadvantages to ensure, as much as possible, that 
all children have equal chances for educational achievement. That view is sub-
ject to a number of philosophical and practical objections,172 but to juxtapose 
the equality and adequacy theories, I need review only one.  
2. The parental liberty objection 
It has long been understood that “complete equality of [educational] oppor-
tunity can be reached only if all the divergent out-of-school influences van-
ish.”173 But, even if it were possible to eliminate the differential effects of so-
cial circumstances and natural endowments on a child’s chances for educational 
achievement, one influence would inevitably remain—the family. As previous-
ly explained, the family’s profound influence on a child’s prospects convinced 
Rawls that fair equality of opportunity could not be fully achieved. James 
Fishkin punctuated the point, explaining that a “trilemma” occurs between for-
mal equality of opportunity (nondiscrimination and meritocracy), substantive 
 
170. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
171. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see id. §§ 1400(d)(1)(B), 1401(9), 
1412(a)(1) (defining and elaborating the standard for a “free appropriate education”); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197 n.21, 199-200 (1982) (holding that “appropriate educa-
tion” does not mean a “potential-maximizing education” but rather “some educational bene-
fit,” a “basic floor of opportunity” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Maureen A. 
MacFarlane, The Shifting Floor of Educational Opportunity: The Impact of Educational Re-
form on Rowley, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 45, 46 & n.6, 47 (2012) (suggesting that “[t]he Rowley 
standard appears to remain intact” but citing articles contending that “legislative changes to 
the IDEA and/or the NCLB” have redefined “free appropriate public education”).  
172. See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Fi-
nance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 143-66 (1995) (critiquing equality on grounds of 
“simplicity,” “normativity,” and “textual conflicts”).  
173. James Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity, 38 HARV. 
EDUC. REV. 7, 21-22 (1968) (emphasis added). 
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equality of opportunity (equal life chances), and family autonomy, such that a 
commitment to any two of these principles precludes the third.174 
To illustrate, imagine Jessie and Stephen are identical twins who have 
roughly the same natural endowments but were adopted by different families at 
birth. Both were adopted by upper-middle-class parents and both attend aca-
demically successful schools in the same district. However, Stephen’s parents 
greatly value and encourage his education whereas Jessie’s parents are less 
supportive. As a result, Stephen exerts more effort in school and graduates at 
the top of his class whereas Jessie receives average marks and graduates in the 
middle. Here, formal equality of opportunity and family autonomy obtain but 
substantive equality of opportunity does not because Stephen and Jessie do not 
enjoy the same chance for success. Equal life chances can be achieved only by 
(1) interfering with how Stephen and Jessie are raised, thus infringing on fami-
ly autonomy, or (2) maintaining family autonomy but instituting a job lottery or 
guaranteeing equality of results in some other fashion, thus forgoing formal 
equality of opportunity.  
Recognizing the limitations of educational equality, Brighouse and Swift 
offer an account “closely connected to Rawls’s principle of fair equality of op-
portunity.”175 Their “meritocratic conception” maintains that equality of educa-
tional opportunity is satisfied when a child’s “prospects for educational 
achievement” depend only on her “talent and effort” and not on her “social 
class background.”176 Like Rawls, Brighouse and Swift accept that their con-
ception of educational equality is “bound to be inadequate.”177 Nevertheless, 
they contend that just because it cannot be fully implemented “does not mean 
that it is false” and not worth pursuing.178 Rather, they propose that educational 
equality should be implemented “as far as possible without undermining other 
more important values” like family autonomy, which they generally refer to as 
parental liberty.179  
Brighouse and Swift, nevertheless, reject the notion that educational 
equality must always yield to parental liberty. In their view, some educational 
equality measures that interfere with parental liberty could be justified, provid-
ed the liberty interest is not one to which parents are entitled “as a matter of 
 
174. FISHKIN, supra note 26, at 4-6. 
175. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 9, at 448. 
176. Id. at 447. Such a “conception of educational equality requires that the government 
concentrate extra resources on children from less advantaged social backgrounds to compen-
sate for their background disadvantage, up to the point that their prospects for achievement 
are equal to those of children from more advantaged backgrounds.” Id. at 459. 
177. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 118. 
178. Id. 
179. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 9, at 449-50. 
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justice.”180 Brighouse and Swift think that parents do have a right to develop 
intimate and loving relationships with their children, and this right would “al-
low parents to spend a good deal of time with their children” and “share their 
values and enthusiasms with their children.”181 These parental liberty interests 
should be safeguarded, they argue, even if they confer educational advantages 
on children. So, for example, reading bedtime stories to children is a “legiti-
mate parental partiality” because it is conducive to intimate familial relation-
ships as well as a child’s emotional development.182 But Brighouse and Swift 
doubt that parents have a countervailing right to invest their resources to secure 
a competitive advantage for their children. They argue, for instance, that send-
ing children to elite private schools, investing in trust funds, or interacting with 
children about “how best to develop [their] human capital” are not essential to 
establishing valuable family relationships, meeting a child’s fundamental inter-
ests, or satisfying parents’ fiduciary responsibilities.183  
To put it mildly, their argument is controversial. Perhaps the least radical 
implication of their view—abolishing private schools—is unconstitutional be-
cause it “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”184 Thus, 
even assuming their theory of legitimate parental partiality is philosophically 
sound, many of its implications are simply unworkable or political nonstarters. 
And, as I noted at the outset, the theories with which I wish to engage here 
must be able to withstand feasibility constraints. 
 
180. Id. at 456-57. 
181. Id. at 457. 
182. See Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Legitimate Parental Partiality, 37 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 43, 57 (2009) (“The parent reading the bedtime story is doing several things sim-
ultaneously. He is intimately sharing physical space with his child; sharing with her the con-
tent of a story selected by one of them; providing the background for future discussions; pre-
paring her for her bedtime and, if she is young enough, calming her; and reinforcing the 
mutual sense of identification one with another. He is giving her exclusive attention in a 
space designated for that exclusive attention at a particularly important time of her day.”). 
183. Id. at 58. 
184. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). But see Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 
1461, 1473-74 (2003) (arguing that abolishing private education satisfies strict scrutiny be-
cause there is “a compelling interest in achieving equality of educational opportunity” but 
acknowledging that his proposal does not have “the slightest chance of implementation for 
the foreseeable future”); Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Education: Is There a Constitu-
tional Difference?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 54 (suggesting that Congress, acting pursuant 
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, could abolish private schools if it concluded that 
“the availability of private schools interfered with society’s ability to reach a point of social 
integration where judgments about people’s worth are made solely on the basis of individual 
merit”). 
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Brighouse and Swift, nevertheless, convincingly argue that parental liberty 
should not be treated as an absolute principle that admits of no exception. They 
have attempted to strike a balance between parental liberty and another prima 
facie principle, educational equality. As I explain in Part III, the idea that “con-
flicting prima facie principles [should] be traded off in particular cases”185 is a 
point of convergence for the equality and adequacy theories. Having examined 
the normative and descriptive accounts of the former, equality of educational 
opportunity, let us undertake a similar analysis of the latter, educational ade-
quacy. 
II. ADEQUACY 
The adequacy movement is a manifestation of the sufficiency doctrine. 
That doctrine can be understood as an expression of two theses, one positive 
and one negative. In short, “[t]he positive thesis stresses the importance of peo-
ple living above a certain threshold, free from deprivation. The negative thesis 
denies the relevance of certain additional distributive requirements.”186 Posi-
tively, sufficientarians think that it is morally valuable for all people to live at 
or above a certain threshold, even if they disagree about where that threshold 
should be set. On their view, it is wrong for some people to live below the 
threshold not because other people live above it (i.e., because inequality in it-
self is unjust) or because those below the threshold stand to benefit more than 
others (i.e., because the worst off should be given priority). Rather, 
sufficientarians think it is simply unjust for people to have to live in depriva-
tion. Few take issue with that general sentiment.187  
Sufficientarian critics do, however, reject the negative thesis, which serves 
as a further indictment of egalitarianism and prioritarianism. Negatively, 
sufficientarians deny the moral significance of any inequalities once everyone 
has secured enough. At that point, whatever inequalities remain are not morally 
offensive, and we have no reason to give priority to the least advantaged; what 
matters is that all have a sufficient level of advantage, not that the least advan-
taged are as advantaged as possible. Though sufficientarianism has attracted 
several eminent theorists,188 I have chosen to feature Elizabeth Anderson’s ac-
 
185. FISHKIN, supra note 26, at 192. 
186. Paula Casal, Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough, 117 ETHICS 296, 297-98 (2007). 
187. Id. at 299 (“[I]t is increasingly difficult to find views that do not accept some ver-
sion of the positive thesis . . . . Few deny that the elimination of certain types of deprivation, 
such as hunger, disease, and ignorance, are very weighty political requirements.”). 
188. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 136-39 (1987); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 92-95, 
380-84 (2006); RAZ, supra note 15, at 240-41; Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compas-
sion, 113 ETHICS 745, 762 (2003); Frankfurt, supra note 15, at 24. 
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count because it coincides with her critique of luck egalitarianism and because 
her sufficientarian conception of justice aligns with educational adequacy. 
A. Democratic Equality  
In her provocative essay, What Is the Point of Equality?, Anderson con-
tends that the luck egalitarian preoccupation with compensating people for 
“undeserved bad luck—being born with poor native endowments, bad parents, 
and disagreeable personalities, suffering from accidents and illnesses, and so 
forth”—is misplaced.189 What troubles us about inequality is not so much the 
disparity in the distribution of goods, resources, or welfare but rather the “rela-
tions between superior and inferior persons.”190 That is, inequality is objection-
able when the better off are able to subjugate the worst off politically and so-
cially.  
Echoing the positive thesis, Anderson believes egalitarians should aim to 
ensure that all persons (1) “have sufficient internal capacities and external re-
sources to enjoy security against oppression—violence, domination, material 
deprivation, social exclusion, stigmatization, and the like” and (2) “have 
enough to function as an equal in society—to fulfill a respected role in the divi-
sion of labor, participate in democratic discussion, appear in public without 
shame, and enjoy equal moral standing to make claims on others.”191  
Anderson explains that to sustain such relational equality, which she dubs 
“democratic equality,” people must have the “capabilities” necessary to escape 
deprivation and maintain standing as equal citizens in a democratic society.192 
Anderson adopts Amartya Sen’s definition of capabilities as people’s real free-
doms to achieve certain states of being or doing—“functionings”—given their 
personal, social, and material resources.193 Functionings range from the ele-
mentary (e.g., being nourished and literate) to more complex achievements 
(e.g., having self-respect and taking part in the life of the community).194 Fol-
lowing Sen, Anderson’s democratic equality aims not for equal levels of 
 
189. Anderson, supra note 16, at 288. 
190. Id. at 312. 
191. Anderson, supra note 9, at 620 (emphasis added); see also NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE 
INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION (1997) (advocat-
ing equality of recognition and redistribution); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE 
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 33-34 (1990) (“[J]ustice is primarily the virtue of citizenship, of 
persons deliberating about problems and issues that confront them collectively in their insti-
tutions and actions, under conditions without domination or oppression, with reciprocity and 
mutual tolerance of difference.”). 
192. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 289, 316. 
193. Compare AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 40 (1992), with Anderson, su-
pra note 16, at 316. 
194. SEN, supra note 193, at 39. 
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functionings but rather for “equality for all in the space of capabilities,” that is, 
“effective access to the goods and relationships of civil society”—the freedom 
to choose and achieve certain valued functionings by utilizing one’s resources, 
broadly defined.195  
Whereas Sen would put his faith in a democratic selection process to value 
and order the essential capabilities, Anderson thinks that we can independently 
identify at least some capabilities that are necessary for equal standing and re-
spect.196 To function as a human being, for instance, Anderson suggests a per-
son needs effective access to (1) “the means of sustaining [her] biological ex-
istence,” such as “food, shelter, clothing, [and] medical care,” and (2) “the 
basic conditions of human agency.”197 To stand as an equal citizen requires 
certain political rights—free speech, free association, voting, etc.—and effec-
tive access to civil society, including the economy. This entails nondiscrimina-
tion, access to public accommodations and the means of production, and the 
freedom to enter into contracts and other cooperative agreements.  
 Significantly, although all citizens are guaranteed access to civil society, 
citizens are not guaranteed full participation. Certain functionings of citizen-
ship require an income, Anderson explains, and “[f]or those capable of working 
and with access to jobs, the actual achievement of these functionings is, in the 
normal case, conditional on participating in the productive system.”198 
Although there is much here to digest, I briefly introduce Anderson’s dem-
ocratic equality because it reflects a sufficientarian image of social justice and 
because it is helpful to understand how Anderson’s defense of adequacy 
thresholds in education fits into the overall framework of her theory.  
 
195. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 316, 318. 
196. Compare SEN, supra note 193, at 44 (“There is no escape from the problem of 
evaluation in selecting a class of functionings . . . .”), with Anderson, supra note 16, at 316 
(arguing that “[r]eflection on the negative and positive aims of egalitarianism helps” identify 
the goods “that are of special egalitarian concern”). 
197. Anderson, supra note 16, at 317. Anderson here provides only a partial listing of 
capabilities. Consistent with Sen, Anderson thinks we arrive at a more complete listing 
through the collective will of citizens, specifically through democratic legislation. See id. at 
332 (“[W]here the concepts of equal standing and respect don’t yield a determinate answer 
to how capabilities should be ranked, the ranking may legitimately be left up to democratic 
legislation.”). 
198. Id. at 321. Anderson envisions a “system of cooperative production” in which peo-
ple regard every product of the economy as jointly produced by everyone working together. 
Everyone’s productive contribution is dependent on what everyone else is doing. Each 
worker, even one in a low-wage position, is essential to the system. See id. at 321-26. 
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B. “Sufficientarian Standard for Fair Educational Opportunity”199 
Effective access to education does not translate into “equal education.”200 
Anderson doubts that equal educational opportunities are necessary to realize 
the democratic equality that she esteems.201 Instead, there need only be “fair 
educational opportunities”—“a sufficientarian or adequacy standard” that ob-
tains when “every student with the potential and interest . . . receive[s] a K-12 
education sufficient to enable him or her to succeed at a college that prepares 
its students for postgraduate education.”202 Specifically, “primary and middle 
schools” must prepare every student “to successfully complete a college pre-
paratory high school curriculum,” and high schools must offer such a curricu-
lum.203 Anderson regards this as a “high but not unattainable” threshold that 
will equip students with the capabilities they need to access civil society and 
function as equal citizens.204  
Anderson sets the threshold high—“education sufficient to qualify [stu-
dents] for success at a four-year residential college”—because she regards a 
college education as essential to attaining “elite” status.205 For democratic 
equality to endure, “those who occupy positions of responsibility and leader-
ship in society” must be socially integrated and responsive to “all sectors of so-
ciety, not just themselves.”206 So disadvantaged students must have effective 
access to the elite ranks, meaning “access within the realistic reach of students 
exercising substantial but not extraordinary effort and within the financial reach 
of their families.”207  
Just as important, the socially advantaged and disadvantaged must be edu-
cated together. Such integration, Anderson contends, will cultivate (1) an 
“awareness of the interests and problems of people from all sectors,” (2) “a dis-
position to serve those interests,” (3) the “technical knowledge of how to ad-
vance these interests,” and (4) “competence in respectful interaction with peo-
ple from all sectors.”208 But, of course, the implications of this view are quite 
dramatic—“comprehensive social integration of schools . . . requires disman-
 
199. Anderson, supra note 9, at 614. 
200. Id. at 615. 
201. See Elizabeth Anderson, Rethinking Equality of Opportunity: Comment on Adam 
Swift’s How Not to Be a Hypocrite, 2 THEORY & RES. EDUC. 99, 105-07 (2004). 
202. Anderson, supra note 9, at 597-98. 
203. Id. at 615. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 614. 
206. Id. at 596. 
207. Id. at 614-15. 
208. Id. at 596. 
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tling the laws and practices that currently enable advantaged communities to 
segregate themselves from the less advantaged.”209 
Perhaps because Anderson’s adequacy threshold is so high, she has little 
trouble pledging to the negative thesis. In principle, she does not perceive any 
injustice in permitting “inequalities in educational access above the sufficiency 
threshold.”210 Although Anderson proposes ways to circumvent racial and class 
segregation (e.g., recognizing the rights of children to cross municipal lines to 
attend public schools in other districts), she does not find it objectionable for 
parents or school districts to decide to spend more on their own children’s edu-
cation, provided the threshold is met for all children. A complaint registered by 
a student teetering at or just over the threshold to a student sailing high above 
the threshold is, on Anderson’s view, motivated by envy.211 Moreover, to pre-
vent expenditures above the threshold would level down “educational opportu-
nities to the lowest common denominator in the name of equality.”212 Leveling 
down thus compromises the degree to which education works as a private and 
public good, “a good to the person who has it, and a good to others,” who, in 
turn, are able to serve more people “in demanding jobs and volunteer service 
positions.”213 As observed in the next Subpart, many of the intuitions that rein-
force Anderson’s sufficientarian platform have resonated with courts that have 
instituted educational adequacy.  
C. Educational Adequacy 
1. Historical and legal perspectives 
Few would be surprised by the revelation that the concept of educational 
adequacy predates the 1989 Supreme Court of Kentucky decision that is said to 
have propelled the third wave of school finance litigation. But educational ade-
quacy goes back much further; in fact, it precedes Brown’s affirmation of 
equality of educational opportunity. Indeed, in two states—Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire—educational adequacy predates the ratification of the U.S. 
 
209. Id. at 619. 
210. Id. at 615; cf. Anderson, supra note 16, at 326 (“Once all citizens enjoy a decent 
set of freedoms, sufficient for functioning as an equal in society, income inequalities beyond 
that point do not seem so troubling in themselves . . . . The stronger the barriers against 
commodifying social status, political influence, and the like, the more acceptable are signifi-
cant income inequalities.” (citing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983); MICKEY 
KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992)).  
211. Anderson, supra note 201, at 105 (“The objection conceives of the development of 
others’ talents as an injury to oneself.”); see also Anderson, supra note 16, at 307. 
212. Anderson, supra note 9, at 615. 
213. Id. 
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Constitution.214 In those states and others, courts have concluded that adequacy 
is embodied in their state constitutions’ education clauses, some of which were 
approved while the nation was still in its infancy, others during the common-
school reforms of the nineteenth century.215 Virtually all state constitutions 
now require state governments to establish and maintain a public school sys-
tem.216 And some state constitutions actually specify a particular level or quali-
ty of education the state must provide.217 
The language of these once-dormant education clauses vary. Some require 
simply a “free” or “liberal” school system; others demand an education that is 
“general,” “uniform,” “thorough,” “efficient,” or some permutation thereof; and 
still others are more particular, as in the case of Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire, obliging their states to “cherish the interests of literature and the scienc-
es.”218 Despite the variation, adequacy lawsuits have been successful across the 
spectrum.219 Although the Kentucky court decision may be fairly characterized 
as the first to formally acknowledge educational adequacy as a constitutional 
obligation, courts during the first wave “awarded victories to plaintiffs on what 
could be called adequacy grounds.”220  
 
214. See McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 523-24 (Mass. 
1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1376-77 (N.H. 
1993). 
215. See Michael A. Rebell, The Right to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 81 & n.139 (2012) (citing John Dinan, The Meaning of State 
Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence from the Constitutional Convention Debates, 70 
ALB. L. REV. 927, 939 (2007); John C. Eastman, Reinterpreting the Education Clauses in 
State Constitutions, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL 
ADEQUACY, supra note 1, at 55); see also Rosemary C. Salomone, The Common School Be-
fore and After Brown: Democracy, Equality, and the Productivity Agenda, 120 YALE L.J. 
1454, 1466-67 (2011). 
216. See Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining 
State Responsibility for Educational Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. 
& L.J. 281, 289 n.20 (“Iowa’s constitution is the only state constitution to make no provi-
sions for educational responsibilities.”); cf. King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa 2012) 
(observing that the Iowa Supreme Court had previously found that “no aspect of the Iowa 
Constitution, including the education clause, authorized the legislature to provide for public 
schools (as opposed to merely funding them)” and surmising that, if “the education clause 
did not even allow the legislature to establish public schools, . . . the clause [cannot be 
viewed] as a source of enforceable minimum standards for such schools”). 
217. Umpstead, supra note 216, at 289-90. 
218. Id. at 290-91.  
219. Id. at 287, 290 (defining “a court decision [as] an adequacy case if (1) the plaintiffs 
argued a state duty to provide an adequate education under the education clause of the state 
constitution, (2) the court agreed that there was a duty, and (3) the court found a possible or 
actual violation of that duty”). 
220. Briffault, supra note 1, at 26 (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 
102 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979)). 
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Yet adequacy did not become a full-fledged litigation strategy until some 
state courts started to resist formal equality of educational opportunity in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.221 Around the same time, several comparative stud-
ies—including A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform, a 
1983 report by the National Commission on Excellence in Education—exposed 
a crisis in the quality of public schools, in both wealthy and impoverished dis-
tricts, that jeopardized the American economy and the country’s ability to com-
pete internationally.222 State governments responded by focusing on academic 
standards and accountability schemes, diverting attention away from the de-
mands for horizontal equity.223 That shift in focus suited legislators and gover-
nors, who did not have the political will to raise taxes or level down and cap 
district spending to guarantee more equitable expenditures.224  
The federal government further incentivized states to welcome standards-
based reform and accountability. In 1994, Congress passed the Goals 2000 Act 
and the Improving America’s Schools Act, providing funding and support to 
states that developed “challenging” reading and math standards and assess-
ments designed to measure student performance.225 Seven years later, the 
NCLB propelled standards and accountability to the forefront of national edu-
cation policy. the NCLB is more demanding than its predecessors, particularly 
in its accountability requirements that levy serious consequences on schools 
failing to make adequate yearly progress toward proficiency on state stand-
ards.226 Yet the NCLB left to the states “virtually unfettered discretion to de-
fine and revise the standards for measuring proficiency.”227  
On that front, education advocates had carried the standards-based reform 
momentum into state courts, contending that education clauses in state constitu-
tions provided a basis for imposing standards that states had to establish and 
 
221. See Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 152, at 55. 
222. See Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in the 
1990s, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 133, at 136, 147. 
223. Id.  
224. Id. at 147, 150; see also James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy 
of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2060 (2002) (noting the political difficulties of equal-
izing school funding). 
225. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 1227 (citing Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.); Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)). 
226. Id. at 1228. 
227. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 
330, 401 (2006). 
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maintain for all students.228 A number of state courts agreed.229 Consistent 
with the sufficientarian positive thesis, those courts determined that their states 
have a duty to provide enough resources to every school district so that all stu-
dents have access to a “substantive level of education . . . mandated by the state 
constitution.”230 Some courts deferred, in whole or in part, to their state legisla-
tures to specify the content of that constitutional duty.231 Other courts under-
took the task of articulating educational adequacy by reference to broad qualita-
tive standards (e.g., “adequate education” or “a sound basic education”) or to 
“specific, though abstract, capacities and skills.”232 The Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky, for example, enumerated seven core capacities.233 
 
228. See Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Ap-
praisal, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra 
note 1, at 1, 7.  
229. See Bauries, supra note 11, at 741 (“[T]he highest courts of twenty-six states have 
addressed education finance constitutional challenges at least partly founded on theories of 
adequacy, and they have issued rulings as to justiciability or have adjudicated the merits and 
either issued or abstained from issuing a remedy.”); West & Peterson, supra note 228, at 2-3, 
6. Courts in eight states—Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, and Rhode Island—declined to reach the merits of an adequacy challenge, relying 
on separation of powers principles in reasoning that their respective state legislatures were 
the appropriate forum in which the plaintiffs should seek their remedy. See Bauries, supra 
note 11, at 741; Tang, supra note 134, at 1195, 1208 & n.60. 
 230. Umpstead, supra note 216, at 297. But see Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 736 (2012) (contending that the affirmative provisions in 
state education clauses are most often adjudicated “as purely duty provisions . . . [that] obli-
gate government to pursue the ends identified but do not necessarily entitle any person to a 
particular level of government service”). 
231. Bauries, supra note 11, at 742 (“Courts in eleven states . . . [have] found a consti-
tutional violation . . . [but] abstained from the remediation of the identified constitutional 
infirmity, leaving it up to the legislative body . . . to construct a remedy.”). 
232. Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 562-63. 
233. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (“[E]ach 
and every child . . . [must have access to] the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral 
and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly 
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to 
enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, 
state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and 
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his 
or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced 
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pur-
sue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to ena-
ble public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, 
in academics or in the job market.”). 
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Nevertheless, the common thread running through these decisions is an 
abiding concern for absolute educational deprivation.234 The adequacy lawsuit, 
like the equality lawsuit before it, is a response to persistent disparities in edu-
cational achievement and the failings of public school systems.235 Moreover, 
despite different judicial approaches and considerable variation in the language 
of education clauses, there has been wide agreement among state courts at-
tempting to define educational adequacy that public schools should equip their 
students with the capability to function as responsible citizens.236  
In these two respects, educational adequacy tracks the twin aims of Ander-
son’s democratic equality—sufficient capability to (1) escape deprivation and 
(2) function as an equal citizen. Of course, no adequacy decision embraces An-
derson’s all-encompassing theory; courts are constrained by the facts of the 
cases before them and the language of the relevant education clauses. For in-
stance, courts have not necessarily emphasized, in Anderson’s terms, the signif-
icance of social integration and effective access to elite status. But, in line with 
Anderson’s fair educational opportunity standard, a considerable number of 
courts favoring adequacy have stressed the importance of preparing students to 
be competitive in higher education and/or in the job market.237 Moreover, sev-
 
234. See Darby & Levy, supra note 2, at 366; Koski & Reich, supra note 2 at 615; West 
& Peterson, supra note 228, at 7-8. 
235. ELAINE M. WALKER, EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY AND THE COURTS: A REFERENCE 
HANDBOOK 51 (2005); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 27 (“A judicial determination of educa-
tional inadequacy in a particular school district is almost always predicated on some finding 
of inequity.”). 
236. See Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 253 
(Conn. 2010) (concluding education clause entitles “public school students to an education 
suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens”); Rebell, supra note 6, at 
1515; Umpstead, supra note 216, at 307-08 (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State 
(Campaign I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 
(N.C. 1997); Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 397 (N.J. 1990); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; Pinto v. 
Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1995); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of 
Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 
(Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)); see also DeRolph v. 
State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ohio 1997) (“[T]he education of our citizenry has been deemed 
vital to our democratic society and to our progress as a state.”). 
237. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 166 (Ala. 1993) (defining adequate 
educational opportunities as, inter alia, “sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to 
enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts . . . in academics 
or in the job market”); Rell, 990 A.2d at 253 (“A constitutionally adequate education also 
will leave Connecticut’s students prepared to progress to institutions of higher education, or 
to attain productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state’s economy.”); Cam-
paign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (Campaign II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 353 (N.Y. 2003) 
(“[T]he Education Article requires the opportunity for a sound high school education that 
should prepare students for higher education, or to compete in the employment market of 
high school graduates.”); DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 737 (“The mission of education is to pre-
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eral of these courts have recognized that education also contributes to chil-
dren’s self-respect and their ability to interact with others.238  
Many of the courts that have considered adequacy a constitutional obliga-
tion have also agreed that the relevant education clauses are not offended when 
local school districts or parents decide to offer opportunities above the state-
mandated threshold or “a better-than-adequate education.”239 In this regard, 
educational adequacy comports with the sufficientarian negative thesis—at 
least the version of that thesis touted by Anderson. It is this particular align-
ment with the sufficiency doctrine that rouses the most forceful objection to 
educational adequacy. There are other notable criticisms of educational ade-
quacy,240 but what I will call the fairness objection strikes at the heart of the 
current equality-adequacy conceptual divide.  
2. The fairness objection 
The central premise of the fairness objection is that education is, in part, a 
positional good. Particularly in the competition for selective-college admissions 
and high-quality jobs, the instrumental value of a person’s education depends 
on the quantity and quality of education she has compared to others.241 That is, 
 
pare students of all ages to meet, to the best of their abilities, the academic, social, civic, and 
employment needs of the twenty-first century . . . .” (citing STATE BD. OF EDUC., PREPARING 
OHIO SCHOOLS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at ii (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Rebell, supra note 6, at 1515; Umpstead, supra note 216, at 309 & nn.179-81 (citing Pinto, 
662 So. 2d at 896; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont II, 703 
A.2d at 1359; Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877).  
238. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d at 166 (interpreting the state constitution to 
require, among other enumerated requirements for “adequate educational opportunities,” 
“sufficient support and guidance so that every student feels a sense of self-worth and ability 
to achieve, and so that every student is encouraged to live up to his or her full human poten-
tial”); Umpstead, supra note 216, at 307 & n.163, 308 & nn.164-66 (citing Pinto, 662 So. 2d 
at 896; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 
1359; Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 397; Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 
P.2d at 94; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877). 
239. Umpstead, supra note 216, at 298, 299 & n.85 (citing Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211-12; 
Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1360; Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 256; DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 746); 
see also Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815 (Ariz. 1994) 
(“Disparities caused by local control do not run afoul of the state constitution because there 
is nothing in art. XI that would prohibit a school district or a county from deciding for itself 
that it wants an educational system that is even better than the general and uniform system 
created by the state.”). 
240. See generally Koski & Reich, supra note 2; Moore, supra note 19; Tang, supra 
note 134. 
241. See Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods, 116 
ETHICS 471, 474-75 (2006); Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 597-99. 
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she will be competitive only if her educational attainment is equivalent to or 
greater than that of her peers.242  
Certainly, education is not a purely positional good, because there is an in-
trinsic value to being an educated person.243 Education can also be regarded as 
a public good to the extent it benefits society in terms of “higher political par-
ticipation, greater income and productivity, and better health.”244 So long as 
education confers competitive benefits, however, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, “to disentangle the positional from the nonpositional aspects of ed-
ucation in the distribution of educational resources.”245 In terms of that distri-
bution, the fairness objection to adequacy is simply this: “getting ‘enough’ will 
not give one a fair chance in competitions to which education is relevant, if 
others are getting more than enough.”246 Equally troubling for adequacy critics 
is the prospect that those students who receive educational opportunities above 
the threshold will be able “to protect, enhance, and entrench their advantage” in 
the competition.247 
In defense of adequacy, Satz questions the degree to which education is a 
positional good, noting that “admission to most colleges in the United States is 
not competitive: almost any high school graduate who applies will be admit-
ted.”248 Still, she concedes that “[e]ducation is probably positional at its upper 
ends”—for example, in the case of admission to selective colleges and universi-
ties.249 And the upper end is pivotal to Satz, who, like Anderson, believes that 
 
242. As Koski and Reich observe, there is some evidence to support the positional na-
ture of education. See Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 599-602. For instance, students from 
private schools or wealthy school districts hold an advantage over students from low-income 
families and poorly financed public schools in the competition for admission to selective 
universities and graduate schools. See id. at 599-600. But see Charles Howell, Education as 
a Positional Good Reconsidered, 1 J. PHIL. STUDY EDUC. 19, 29-30 (2011) (contending that 
the positional goods argument is misleading because it assumes “everyone competes with 
everyone else in a particular regional or local employment pool” and “treats competitive in-
teraction as a dyadic relationship, in which one party gains at the expense of another,” when, 
in reality, “there is always a third party[:] . . . . the employer”). 
243. Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 598-99; see also Brighouse & Swift, supra note 
241, at 482 (“The educated person has a world of culture, complexity, and enjoyment opened 
to her, engaging in which is valuable in ways that are not competitive.”). 
244. Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 598. 
245. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 241, at 483. 
246. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 9, at 462; see also Johannes Giesinger, Education, 
Fair Competition, and Concern for the Worst Off, 61 EDUC. THEORY 41, 42 (2011) (“[T]he 
main egalitarian objection against the adequacy view is that it does not provide an adequate 
answer to the problem of fair competition.”). 
247. Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 611. 
248. Satz, supra note 8, at 437.  
249. Id.; see also Liu, supra note 227, at 347 n.67 (contending that the fairness objec-
tion “has its bite primarily at the upper end of the educational distribution, where the posi-
tional features of education are most apparent”). 
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education must serve “to integrate such privileged positions in universities and 
employment across class and racial lines.”250 Otherwise, “adequacy is not ade-
quate to its purpose.”251 
Anderson’s answer to the fairness objection is for selective colleges and 
universities to engage in race- and class-based affirmative action.252 She pro-
poses that college admissions committees “discount the positional advantages” 
of those students whose better-than-adequate education would add compara-
tively little value to the makeup of the college class.253  
Recall that, on Anderson’s view, academic knowledge is but one type of 
knowledge that elites must have to be responsive to the interests and concerns 
of others. And “[a]cquiring the other types of knowledge requires that elites be 
drawn from all social groups and be educated together, in integrated settings 
that foster intergroup communication and cooperation on terms of equality.”254 
Hence, students receiving a better-than-adequate education should not be the 
admissions committee’s automatic choice in a “head-to-head competition with 
sufficiently academically prepared students from disadvantaged social back-
grounds.”255 Rather, the admissions committee should “give substantial weight 
to the imperative of integration” so that there will be a “substantial representa-
tion of disadvantaged groups” in the college class.256 Anderson concludes that 
such affirmative-action-type measures would resolve the fairness objection by 
“giving the less advantaged a positional good that counterbalances the position-
al advantages the prosperous obtain from investing more resources in their 
children’s academic preparation.”257  
Like Brighouse and Swift’s response to the parental liberty objection (e.g., 
abolish private schools), Anderson’s reply to the fairness objection (expand af-
firmative action measures) is highly contentious and rests on shaky constitu-
tional ground. Although Anderson does not believe that her “integrationist the-
ory” is “impossible or unreasonably difficult for people to meet,” she 
acknowledges the trend among legislatures, courts, and voters to curtail or 
eliminate affirmative action programs in higher education and impede integra-
 
250. Satz, supra note 8, at 438. 
251. Id.  
252. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 616-18; see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE 
IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 135-54 (2010) (advocating an “integrative model” of affirma-
tive action requiring “institutions capable of promoting racial integration” to seek “a critical 
mass of any segregated and stigmatized racial group”). 
253. Anderson, supra note 9, at 616. 
254. Id.  
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 617-18. 
257. Id. at 618. 
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tion efforts in K-12 schools.258 Moreover, the impulse behind Anderson’s inte-
grationist theory—that elites should be constituted to “serve all sectors of so-
ciety, not just themselves”259—seems to run afoul of the individualistic lean-
ings of American culture and perhaps puts too much faith in the educated elite 
to serve the disadvantaged.260  
Notwithstanding the political feasibility concerns, Anderson’s response to 
the fairness objection is telling, suggesting that she is not fully committed to the 
negative thesis. Indeed, rather than being completely indifferent to educational 
inequalities above the adequacy threshold, Anderson proposes an integration 
imperative to “counterbalance” them.261 Satz shares Anderson’s concern for 
educational inequalities above the threshold, recognizing that “large inequali-
ties regarding who has a real opportunity for important goods above citizen-
ship’s threshold relegate some members of society to second-class citizenship, 
where they are denied effective access to positions of power and privilege in 
the society.”262 Satz would avoid this disparate effect by making the adequacy 
threshold elastic, dependent on the educational resources “that others have and 
[on] what they can do with those resources.”263 
We will revisit Anderson’s and Satz’s responses to the fairness objection in 
Part III. For now, it is important to appreciate that the objection forces Ander-
son and Satz to forsake the part of the sufficientarian negative thesis that denies 
the moral significance of inequalities above the threshold. Much like the con-
cessions made by Brighouse and Swift to the parental liberty objection, Ander-
son’s and Satz’s digression from the negative thesis in the face of the fairness 
 
258. ANDERSON, supra note 252, at 189-90; see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 
S. Ct. 2411, 2419-20 (2013) (reaffirming that colleges and universities have a compelling 
interest in achieving a diverse student body but insisting that race-conscious measures satisfy 
strict scrutiny—which requires a finding that “no workable race-neutral alternatives would 
produce the educational benefits of diversity”—and that universities are not entitled to defer-
ence on this narrow tailoring requirement); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007) (striking down voluntary desegregation plans relying 
on racial classification as failing to satisfy strict scrutiny); Todd Donovan, Direct Democra-
cy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1730, 1741 n.64 (2013) (describing 
state referendums and initiatives aimed at repealing affirmative action programs); James E. 
Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 133 (2007) 
(observing that, post-Parents Involved, the Court seems hostile to integration, noting that 
“four Justices make the goal itself seem dastardly, while Justice Kennedy accepts the goal 
but voices intense distaste over the most straightforward means of achieving it” (footnote 
omitted)). 
259. Anderson, supra note 9, at 596. 
260. Derrick Darby, Adequacy, Inequality, and Cash for Grades, 9 THEORY & RES. 
EDUC. 209, 217 (2011). 
261. Anderson, supra note 9, at 618. 
262. Satz, supra note 8, at 434. 
263. Id. 
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objection splinters the equality-adequacy divide, creating the possibility that 
these theories can occupy the same conceptual terrain.  
III. EQUALITY AND ADEQUACY  
Thus far I have traced the philosophical pedigrees of equality and adequacy 
and observed how the theories have been reflected in the law. Ending the dis-
cussion there would reinforce the traditional view that, although equality and 
adequacy attempt to remedy similar forms of educational injustice, they remain 
theoretically and practically incompatible. The emerging contemporary view, 
however, recognizes that the theories tend to overlap conceptually and that “the 
equality and adequacy cases borrow heavily from each others’ doctrinal under-
pinnings and normative rationales.”264 I specify four such points of conver-
gence, which I think demonstrate that the theories are not diametric opposites. 
Rather, as discussed further below, equality and adequacy can maintain a cohe-
sive, symbiotic relationship. 
A. Points of Convergence for Equality and Adequacy 
Although there is ample literature contrasting equality and adequacy, there 
has been relatively little exploration of the confluence of the two theories. I ar-
gue that equality and adequacy converge along four significant points: (1) edu-
cational equality and adequacy theorists and practitioners embrace value plural-
ism, acknowledging that neither equality nor adequacy is an a priori moral 
principle; (2) contrary to the conventional understanding, adequacy, like equali-
ty, can be relational or comparative—in fact, its relativity has been apparent in 
its application; (3) educational egalitarians agree with the sufficientarian posi-
tive thesis that it is wrong for children to be deprived of a minimally adequate 
education; and, likewise, (4) educational sufficientarians agree with many egal-
itarians that public education should advance social equality.  
1. Pluralism 
Recall that contemporary egalitarians reject equality of results in favor of 
equality of opportunity because they recognize that strict equality extinguishes 
liberty, fosters irresponsibility, snubs diversity, and stifles productivity. Alt-
hough equality is an important ideal, it is not worth sacrificing other values 
deemed necessary for a moral and progressive society.265 Similarly, the leading 
 
264. Reynolds, supra note 167, at 750 n.9. 
265. See Alan Carter, Value-Pluralist Egalitarianism, 99 J. PHIL. 577, 578 (2002); 
Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 81, 107 (Matthew Clayton & 
Andrew Williams eds., 2002). 
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educational equality and adequacy theorists are pluralists.266 They do not re-
gard either equality or adequacy as absolute principles that must be pursued at 
all costs. Rather, they acknowledge that there are other competing values that 
should factor into the demands of educational justice.  
Brighouse and Swift, for instance, consider educational equality to be “a 
lesser value” than two other principles: (1) in the distribution of educational re-
sources, priority ought to be given to the least advantaged children, and (2) 
“parents and children should be able to enjoy successful intimate relationships 
with one another.”267 Similarly, Anderson and Satz think that educational ade-
quacy must yield to the aims of democratic or civic equality. Some intervention 
is necessary, in their view, when inequalities above the adequacy threshold “ef-
fectively bar[] a social subgroup of citizens from aspiring to more than suffi-
cient wealth or better than sufficient jobs.”268 Consequently, the equality and 
adequacy theories tolerate a certain degree of educational inequality in capitula-
tion to some other principle (e.g., liberty or relational equality). 
In adjudicating educational obligations, courts also weigh equality or ade-
quacy against other values—individual freedoms, separation of powers, local 
control, and financial efficiencies.269 Indeed, even courts that have recognized 
education as a fundamental right consider other compelling state interests when 
they apply strict scrutiny.270 Therefore, in theory and in practice, equality and 
 
266. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1 (1993) (ad-
vocating a pluralist-expressive theory of value); Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 118 
(“[E]galitarians are not only egalitarians. . . . [T]hey should be pluralists about value, believ-
ing only that equality is one value to be weighed against others.”); Koski & Reich, supra 
note 2, at 613 (“Equality is not all that theorists, practitioners, or citizens care about. We 
should be pluralists.”).  
267. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 120. 
268. Anderson, supra note 201, at 106; see also Satz, supra note 8, at 434 (“[A]n edu-
cation system that precludes the children of poorer families from competing in the same 
market and society as their wealthier peers cannot be adequate.”). 
269. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“[A] State’s interest in 
universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process 
when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment . . . .”); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 
651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (balancing right to education against government’s financing 
plan); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 148-49 (Or. 1976) (upholding state financing system 
after balancing interest in educational opportunity against state’s objective of furthering local 
control). 
270. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 159 (Ala. 1993) (“Because edu-
cation is a fundamental right under the Alabama constitution, the stark inequities in educa-
tional opportunity offered schoolchildren in this state must be justified under strict scrutiny 
by a compelling state interest . . . .”); Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (“[T]he 
school financing system before us must be examined . . . with that strict and searching scru-
tiny appropriate to such a case.”); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977) (“[I]n 
Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that 
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adequacy function as “prima facie” principles that can be counterbalanced or 
overridden by one another or by other moral principles “in particular cases.”271  
2. Relativity 
“The fundamental conceptual difference between equality and [adequacy],” 
according to equality defenders William Koski and Rob Reich, “is that equality 
is necessarily comparative or relational while [adequacy] is not.”272 In deter-
mining whether students X and Y have an equal distribution of an educational 
resource, we must ask: do X and Y each have the same amount of the re-
source?273 However, in deciding whether students X and Y have adequate edu-
cational resources, we do not judge how much of the resource X has compared 
to Y but rather simply ask: do X and Y each have a sufficient amount of the re-
source to satisfy some threshold?274 Proponents of educational adequacy object 
that this commonly accepted characterization of adequacy is “artificially 
thin.”275 As noted in Satz’s response to the fairness objection above, adequacy 
must be relational and dynamic because what it takes to be an equal citizen—
that is, where to set the adequacy threshold—invariably turns on what educa-
tional resources others have.276  
 
right must be strictly scrutinized.”); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) 
(“Because education is a fundamental constitutional right . . . , any discriminatory classifica-
tion found in the educational financing system cannot stand unless the State can demonstrate 
some compelling State interest to justify the unequal classification.”); Washakie Cnty. Sch. 
Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 335 (Wyo. 1980) (holding that the state had failed 
to meet its “burden of demonstrating a compelling interest” to justify an unequal school fi-
nance system). 
271. Cf. FISHKIN, supra note 26, at 192-93. Fishkin concludes that “a defensible liberal-
ism” is one that recognizes that the trilemma—of formal equality of opportunity (nondis-
crimination and meritocracy), substantive equality of opportunity (equal life chances), and 
the autonomy of the family—requires balancing of these prima facie principles “in particular 
cases as they present themselves.” Id. at 192-93. Although this does not provide a “single 
vision of social justice,” Fishkin argues that it “may be the most honest response to the true 
difficulties of distributive justice.” Id. at 193. 
272. Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 589. 
273. Id. 
274. See id. 
275. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 227, at 347. 
276. See GUTMANN, supra note 188, at 136 (“[I]nequalities in the distribution of educa-
tional goods can be justified if, but only if, they do not deprive any child of the ability to par-
ticipate effectively in the democratic process . . . .”); Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The 
Rise of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 895-96 (2006) (observing that 
“adequacy is a fuzzy concept not at all distinct from equality,” because what is adequate “is 
not an objective question” but one to be determined in part by reviewing what well-financed, 
high-performing schools propose and achieve); Satz, supra note 8, at 434 (“When some peo-
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To their credit, Koski and Reich accurately observe that the version of ade-
quacy that is consistent with the sufficientarian negative thesis is non-
relational. Indeed, that seems to be the whole point of the negative thesis. But, 
as previously explained, the construal of adequacy endorsed by Satz and An-
derson, its leading theorists, is not fully committed to the negative thesis. An-
derson and Satz are concerned with large-scale inequalities above the threshold 
that undermine democratic equality. Thus, they seem to believe it is necessary 
at times to recalibrate the threshold to ensure that the students obtaining an ad-
equate education are not subordinated to second-class citizenship and can func-
tion as equal citizens with students obtaining a better-than-adequate education. 
Indeed, some courts have said as much, suggesting that “what the Legislature 
today considers to be ‘supplementation’ may tomorrow become necessary to 
satisfy the constitutional mandate.”277 
At bottom, the debate over adequacy’s relativity is mostly academic at this 
point because, as James Ryan has pointed out, “[m]ost courts that have ruled in 
favor of school finance plaintiffs seem to recognize, either implicitly or explic-
itly, that the sufficiency of a student’s education is necessarily a relative con-
cept.”278 Even court decisions that “focus more on the adequacy of inputs or 
outcomes still have a comparative aspect, either in the proof relied upon or in 
the definition of the adequacy standard.”279 Again, the “driving force” in suc-
cessful adequacy cases has been “the lack of comparable resources and oppor-
tunities among different schools.”280 That comparative element is particularly 
pronounced in the decisions that articulate adequacy in terms of preparing stu-
dents in the competition for admission to higher education and high-quality 
jobs.281  
Accordingly, adequacy is construed more in line with the version advanced 
by Anderson and Satz than the one scrutinized by Koski and Reich. In practice, 
then, adequacy, like educational equality, has entailed relational or comparative 
elements. 
 
ple have a lot more than others, this may affect what others need to take part in community 
life.”). 
277. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 732 (Tex. 1995). 
278. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1239 (“The basic idea is simple: to determine whether one 
child is receiving a sufficient education, you have to know what others are learning.”). 
279. Id. at 1232 (citing Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197-98 
(Ky. 1989); Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1356-57, 1360 (N.H. 1997); Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 
417, 433 (N.J. 1997); State v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325, 330-31 (Wyo. 2001)). 
280. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1233. 
281. Id. at 1237-38, 1241 (“Clearly, one’s ability to compete for employment or admis-
sion to higher education requires comparable educational opportunities at the elementary and 
secondary level.”); see also Briffault, supra note 1, at 28 (“Adequacy defined in terms of 
competitiveness necessarily has a comparative and egalitarian component.”).  
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3. A positive thesis 
Sufficientarians do not monopolize the positive thesis. Many egalitarians, 
for instance, “accept Rawls’s view that a just society will guarantee a social 
minimum and may even agree that any reasonable conception of justice will 
favor ‘measures ensuring for all citizens adequate . . . means to make effective 
use of their freedoms.’”282 Self-professed “educational egalitarians” Brighouse 
and Swift also have little trouble accepting the positive thesis, arguing that 
“[e]veryone should receive an education sufficient for them to become effective 
and deliberative participants in the political process, to be able to be productive 
and self-confident members of the workforce, and to deal with those more ad-
vantaged than they are as peers.”283 
Of course, courts, legislatures, and advocates wrestle with the contours of 
the positive thesis, particularly in determining what is “enough” education. 
Mere recognition that educational deprivation is wrong does not yield a deter-
minate threshold or a judicially manageable standard. And, as previously ex-
plained, the vague and often broadly worded education clauses in state constitu-
tions offer little guidance to policymakers. Recall that Anderson thinks that part 
of the threshold can be derived objectively based on the capabilities believed 
necessary for people to function as equal citizens. Some courts, most notably 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky, have taken that approach and articulated their 
view of the core capabilities that an adequate education should advance. Other 
courts defer to their legislatures, occasioning the democratic selection process 
favored by Sen. Pragmatically, both courts and legislatures have employed 
methodologies for determining the cost of an adequate education by focusing 
on educational inputs and outputs.284  
Notwithstanding the persistent struggle to define the threshold, there seems 
to be widespread consensus that students are at least entitled to an adequate ed-
ucation. And the consensus is largely due to near universal agreement with the 
positive thesis.  
 
282. Casal, supra note 186, at 299 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 582 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999)). 
283. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 9, at 462; see Kenneth A. Strike, Equality of Op-
portunity and School Finance: A Commentary on Ladd, Satz, and Brighouse and Swift, 3 
EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 467, 472 (2008) (“[W]e must provide an adequate education to every-
one. There is a threshold we must not fall below . . . to meet certain minimal requirements of 
justice as well as to secure other elective social goals.”). 
284. See William S. Koski, Achieving “Adequacy” in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 13, 22-23 (2007) (describing the professional judgment, evidence-based, suc-
cessful schools, and cost-function models); see also Bruce D. Baker & Preston C. Green, III, 
Conceptions, Measurement, and Application of Educational Adequacy and Equal Education-
al Opportunity, in HANDBOOK OF EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 438, 442-44 (Gary Sykes et 
al. eds., 2009). 
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4. Social equality  
Egalitarians do not monopolize the concern for social equality. Indeed, 
sufficientarians Anderson and Satz ostensibly believe that “the most urgent 
consideration of justice is to create egalitarian relationships among the mem-
bers of the democratic community.”285 Again, from Anderson’s perspective, 
the trouble with inequality is the consequent relations between “superior” and 
“inferior” persons, not disparities in the distribution of goods or opportunities. 
Similarly, Satz’s “equal-citizenship view targets inequality at salient and injuri-
ous lines of social division that lead to disadvantage.”286  
Consistent with the social-equality platform, Anderson and Satz would as-
sent to equality of opportunity’s nondiscrimination principle, because prohibit-
ing discrimination would eliminate one mechanism for social oppression.287 
Their fidelity to nondiscrimination would perhaps also lead them to agree with 
several of the first- and second-wave school-finance decisions that found 
wealth discrimination in public school funding contravened equal protection 
guarantees in state constitutions. But neither Anderson nor Satz would approve 
of horizontal equity as the remedy for such discrimination.288 In fact, Anderson 
and Satz seem to endorse a prominent mechanism of fiscal neutrality known as 
“power equalization”—“an ‘equal tax rates, equal spendable dollars’ criterion 
of equity in public school finance, according to which communities should be 
entitled to draw funds from a common tax base in proportion to their willing-
 
285. Giesinger, supra note 246, at 51; see also Anderson, supra note 201, at 106 
(“Democratic equality is egalitarian in its conception of just relationships among citizens, 
but sufficientarian in its conception of justice in the distribution of resources and opportuni-
ties.”). 
286. Debra Satz, Unequal Chances: Race, Class and Schooling, 10 THEORY & RES. 
EDUC. 155, 167 (2012). 
287. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 317 (“[E]nabling all citizens to stand as equals to 
one another in civil society . . . requires that careers be open to talents.”); see also Anderson, 
supra note 9, at 605 (noting the negative effects of stereotypes that cause “discrimination 
against members of disadvantaged groups, especially when they have or seek access to elite 
positions”).  
Sufficientarians, of course, can offer nonegalitarian reasons for opposing discrimina-
tion. See supra note 44. Frankfurt, for instance, believes that discrimination is wrong be-
cause it entails failing to treat persons with respect by failing to consider them based only on 
the characteristics and circumstances that are relevant to the position or circumstance in 
question. See Casal, supra note 186, at 301-02. 
288. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 615 (“[T]he consequence of implementing an 
equality-of-resources criterion of fair educational opportunity would be to level down oppor-
tunities to the tastes of the median voter . . . at a significant cost to human development.”); 
Satz, supra note 8, at 426-27 (arguing against horizontal equity because (1) it “is compatible 
with leveling educational resources downward for all,” (2) “equal financial inputs do not 
yield equal resources,” and (3) “equal funding may not translate into equal education, insofar 
as the school’s organization and infrastructure ensure that the money is badly spent”). 
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ness to tax themselves, with equal tax rates yielding equal tax revenues.”289 
Implicit in their endorsement of power equalization is the recognition that 
wealth discrimination undercuts the social equality agenda.290 Otherwise, they 
would regard even vast funding disparities between districts as immaterial, 
provided that all districts had enough funding to deliver an adequate education. 
Anderson and Satz, of course, set their sights much higher than nondis-
crimination. Both consider racial and class integration as an imperative of K-12 
and higher education. On that score, Satz contends that adequacy actually holds 
an advantage because, from the adequacy perspective, “integration is a consti-
tutive part of education for citizenship” whereas, from the equality of educa-
tional opportunity viewpoint, integration is “instrumental to achieving more 
equal opportunities for poor children.”291 But Brighouse and Swift observe that 
“there are also distinctively egalitarian reasons to argue for integration.”292  
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to judge who has the better argu-
ment for integration. The point I want to make, put simply by Satz, is that 
“[a]dequacy for citizenship has egalitarian dimensions” in its concern for social 
equality.293 That concern “may also be a necessary element for achieving an 
equality-based right to education, thereby helping to bridge the gap between the 
adequacy and equality approaches.”294 
 
289. Anderson, supra note 9, at 618 n.41 (citing COONS ET AL., supra note 131); see al-
so Satz, supra note 8, at 439. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman were the first to outline the dis-
trict-power-equalizing scheme for implementing fiscal neutrality. See COONS ET AL., supra 
note 131, at 202. Coons and Sugarman later expanded on the concept, proposing “family 
power equalizing,” which bases tuition for school vouchers on a family’s ability to pay. See 
JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY 
CONTROL 198 (1999). 
290. See Satz, supra note 286, at 165 (“[W]hat is needed is a way of ensuring that the 
gap between the least advantaged and the most advantaged is not so great that it undermines 
the conditions for equal citizenship . . . . [E]veryone must have a reasonably high proportion 
of what others have.”); see also GUTMANN, supra note 188, at 127 (“In its application to 
primary schooling, whose social purpose is to develop democratic character in all citizens, 
the principle of nondiscrimination becomes a principle of nonexclusion: no educable child 
may be excluded from an education adequate to participating in the processes that structure 
choice among good lives.”). 
291. Satz, supra note 8, at 436. 
292. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 122. For instance, they suggest that integration 
would benefit disadvantaged children by giving them access to the greater educational re-
sources demanded by the parents of more advantaged children. Id. 
293. Satz, supra note 8, at 435. 
294. Darby & Levy, supra note 2, at 370. 
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B. Projecting an Equality and Adequacy Alliance  
In this last Subpart, I want to entertain the notion that has garnered support 
in recent years—that “a fully satisfactory theory of justice in education should 
account for the importance of both adequacy and equality.”295  
1. Adequately equal: equality of educational opportunity without 
“equal” life chances 
In his second inaugural address, President Barack Obama reiterated what 
many other Presidents and American political leaders have in essence said be-
fore him, that we as a nation  
are true to our creed when a little girl born into the bleakest poverty knows 
that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody else, because she is an 
American; she is free and she is equal, not just in the eyes of God, but also in 
our own.296  
Such rhetoric evoking equal life chances enjoys broad political appeal in 
the United States, where the American Dream remains gospel. Indeed, Koski 
and Reich regard the American Dream as so integral to our national ethos that it 
“provide[s] an independent argument” for equality of educational opportunity 
because “the schoolhouse is the main engine to realize [that] Dream.”297 It may 
be imprudent to challenge such a cherished ideal, but I do not believe that equal 
life chances—or, in this context, equal chances for educational achievement—
should be a guiding principle in the pursuit of educational equality. 
It seems to be an accepted but often deliberately ignored truth that equal 
chances for educational achievement among all children is impossible. As pre-
viously discussed, that goal cannot be attained without completely neutralizing 
all of the differential effects of social circumstances (e.g., race, class, and gen-
der) and natural endowments (innate talents and (dis)abilities) on every child’s 
chances for educational achievement. We simply cannot marshal enough re-
sources to make that happen. Indeed, for some children, the resources that they 
would need would be virtually insatiable.298 And, even if scarcity were not an 
issue and all social and natural factors could somehow be neutralized, equal 
chances for educational achievement still could not be realized without elimi-
nating the influence of family life on a child’s prospects through a “massive 
 
295. Id. at 369; see also Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 118 (“[A]dequacy . . . is 
not . . . the only principle of justice in education . . . . [T]here is a place for a principle of ed-
ucational equality in a fully specified conception of justice in education.”). 
296. Inaugural Address, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 32, at 2 (Jan. 21, 2013) (empha-
sis added). 
297. Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 608, 611. 
298. See Lesley Jacobs, Equality, Adequacy, and Stakes Fairness: Retrieving the Equal 
Opportunities in Education Approach, 8 THEORY & RES. EDUC. 249, 253-54 (2010). 
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system of collectivized child-rearing” at the expense of parental liberty.299 
Even then, as Brighouse points out, unavoidable differences in the operation of 
such state-run orphanages would produce unequal chances.300 
Notably, Brighouse and Swift’s “meritocratic conception” of equality of 
educational opportunity does not require that each child’s chances for educa-
tional achievement are equal to those of every other child. They realize that dif-
ferences in, inter alia, the level of innate talent and motivation make that an im-
practicable goal. So their conception tolerates “considerable inequality” in 
“educational achievement” among all children.301 But, among children with the 
same measure of talent and motivation, Brighouse and Swift think that the 
“children from less advantaged social backgrounds” should be brought “up to 
the point that their prospects for achievement are equal to those of children 
from more advantaged backgrounds.”302 
Given Brighouse and Swift’s response to the parental liberty objection, I 
take it that they would admit that literally equal chances for educational 
achievement cannot be secured even among the similarly talented and motivat-
ed. Rather, equality of educational opportunity “can only be approached and 
never fully reached.”303 That assessment is unlikely to trouble Brighouse and 
Swift, who, as pluralists, believe that “equality is one value to be weighed 
against others.”304 So, in their view, we should attempt to implement equal 
chances for educational achievement among the similarly talented and motivat-
ed “as far as possible without undermining other more important values.”305 
However, the coupling of the belief on the one hand that equal chances for ed-
ucational achievement should be a guiding moral principle with the recognition 
on the other hand that realization of that principle is infeasible seems to violate 
the maxim “ought implies can.”306 That is, if we have a moral obligation to en-
sure equal chances for educational achievement, then we should be able to 
bring that about.307 
 
299. See FISHKIN, supra note 26, at 64-65. Alternatively, we could forgo formal equali-
ty of opportunity (nondiscrimination and meritocracy) in favor of some mechanism for 
achieving equality of results.  
300. See BRIGHOUSE, supra note 55, at 55-56. 
301. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 9, at 448. 
302. Id. at 459 (emphasis added). 
303. Coleman, supra note 173, at 22. 
304. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 118. 
305. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 9, at 449 (emphasis added). 
306. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (1788), reprinted in 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 133, 163-64 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). 
307. Brighouse and Swift might take exception to my assumption that they would re-
gard equal chances for educational achievement among the similarly talented and motivated 
as impossible. Elsewhere, Brighouse has suggested that we could achieve equal educational 
opportunity by “either handicap[ping] the advantaged or compensat[ing] the disadvantaged 
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In response, Brighouse and Swift might suggest that equal chances for ed-
ucational achievement is somewhat of a misnomer. What equality of educa-
tional opportunity requires is not literally equal chances but approximately 
equal chances.308 If so, then equality of educational opportunity begins to look 
remarkably like high-threshold adequacy.309 To be sure, even high-threshold 
adequacy does not aim to approximate equal chances, but that seems to be the 
upshot of setting the threshold so high.  
For instance, we could expect a considerable reduction of inequalities in 
educational achievement if the threshold were, as Anderson proposes, a K-12 
education that will enable students to complete a four-year residential college 
curriculum designed to prepare them for success in pursuing a postgraduate or 
professional education.310 High thresholds can diminish positional advantages. 
 
with much greater attention and resources, sufficiently to equalize their prospects.” HARRY 
BRIGHOUSE, SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 143 (2000). But his more recent scholar-
ship with Swift seems to recognize that there would be feasibility constraints even assuming 
the best possible circumstances. Some might deny that ought always implies can, asserting 
instead that we have weighty moral reasons to pursue equal chances for educational 
achievement even if we could never fulfill its demands. See MASON, supra note 37, at 98-99. 
I do not find that argument compelling; indeed, I find it incoherent. See Colin Farrelly, Jus-
tice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation, 55 POL. STUD. 844, 845 (2007). And, based on my read-
ing, Brighouse and Swift convey, to varying degrees, a healthy respect for the ought-implies-
can principle. See BRIGHOUSE, supra note 55, at 28 (“No principle of justice can be a true 
principle if, in the most favourable circumstances possible, it would be impossible to imple-
ment that principle to the full extent demanded by its place in the theory of justice.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Adam Swift, The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstanc-
es, 34 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 363, 369 (2008) (“On my conception of how things fit together, 
philosophy provides the careful conceptual and evaluative thinking needed to rank the op-
tions that social science tells us to be within the feasible set. Only by bringing the two to-
gether can we sensibly judge what to do.”).  
308. See Strike, supra note 283, at 481 (“What [educational egalitarians] are trying to 
do is to create a basic structure of opportunity that provides approximate equality among 
groups characterized by educationally irrelevant criteria (such as race) as far as access to the 
prized goods and position of our society is concerned.”). 
309. See Liu, supra note 279, at 347 n.67; cf. Lisa R. Pruitt, Human Rights and Devel-
opment for India’s Rural Remnant: A Capabilities-Based Assessment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
803, 845-46 (2011) (drawing on Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, proposing “parity” as a 
“hybrid concept” of adequacy and equality, “a standard lower than strict equality that never-
theless is relative”).  
310. See Randall R. Curren, Justice and the Threshold of Educational Equality, in THE 
ETHICS OF TEACHING 331, 333 (Michael A. Boylan ed., 2006) (contending that the higher the 
threshold, the more adequacy converts to pure relational equality); Rob Reich, Equality, Ad-
equacy, and K-12 Education, in EDUCATION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY 43, 55 (Danielle Al-
len & Rob Reich eds., 2013) (“Defining the equal standing of citizens in a robust manner, 
such that opportunities to participate in civic life are roughly equal, will bring the adequacy 
orientation much closer to the equality orientation in practice.”); see also RYAN, supra note 
7, at 176 (suggesting that if funding levels in wealthy districts sets the “benchmark against 
which equity and adequacy of funding should be judged,” then that should prompt “states to 
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They cannot eliminate them, but neither can a school system pursuing approx-
imately equal chances. The question then “becomes one of degree of proximi-
ty” to equal chances.311  
Equality defenders nevertheless maintain that adequacy sends the wrong 
message to those receiving the threshold level of education:  
We have provided an education that has enabled you to compete for these 
prized positions. Granted that you have certain disadvantages in competing 
and others have certain advantages, so we do not expect that you will succeed 
at the same rate as more favored populations. Nevertheless our duty to create a 
just society is met by an education that is good enough to enable you to com-
pete even if this competition is unequal.312 
But that message is no more harmful than the one equality of educational 
opportunity conveys by perpetuating the fiction that equal chances for educa-
tional achievement is attainable. That theme “creates deep misunderstandings 
and . . . political tensions,” for the promise of the American Dream often reso-
nates not as an ideal but as reality.313 Hence, those “who fail are further stigma-
tized because they presumably manifest—to winners more than to losers, to be 
sure—weakness of will or lack of talent.”314 
If neither adequacy nor equality alone expresses a fair or truthful idea, then 
perhaps their joint expression can. We say to the student,  
You are entitled to an education that will provide a reasonably high chance of 
educational achievement in K-12 and postsecondary schooling. Inevitably, 
your chance of educational success may be somewhat greater or less than oth-
ers. Nevertheless, when the achievement gap becomes so disproportionate that 
 
level up spending in property-poor districts so that it is at least ‘substantially equal’ or com-
parable to spending in property-rich districts”). 
311. See Coleman, supra note 173, at 22; see also Helen Ladd & Susanna Loeb, The 
Challenges of Measuring School Quality: Implications for Educational Equity, in 
EDUCATION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 310, at 19, 40 (“[W]hile equity as equal 
opportunity and equity as adequacy differ conceptually, the use of proximal outcome 
measures of quality makes them quite similar in terms of the relative merits of different ap-
proaches to measuring quality.”). 
312. Strike, supra note 283, at 486; see also Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 606 
(“Equality is better than adequacy in that unequal schooling can create stigma, insult an in-
dividual’s self-worth, and undermine the social bases of self-respect.”); Reich, supra note 
310, at 57 (“There is something objectionable about the use of formal public institutions, 
such as public schools, to deliver resources over and above the level of sufficiency. . . . [By 
endorsing adequacy], the state confers its imprimatur on the advantage, and this can consti-
tute a dignitary harm to individuals.”). 
313. Jennifer L. Hochschild, The Word American Ends in “Can”: The Ambiguous 
Promise of the American Dream, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 139, 151 (1992). 
314. Id. at 161; see also KAUS, supra note 210, at 37 (contending that a strict adherence 
to meritocracy against a supposed backdrop of equal opportunity encourages distinctions 
between the successful and unsuccessful, such that the successful can not only boast of their 
success but also claim they are more valuable). 
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you and other students similarly situated cannot compete, then we will aug-
ment your educational opportunities to put you and your peers on more equi-
table footing. 
Equality and adequacy expressed in this manner are consistent with a num-
ber of court decisions that have recognized that “absolute equality or precisely 
equal advantages are not required and cannot be attained except in the most rel-
ative sense.”315 Rather, the state’s obligation is to “provide an excellent educa-
tion program for all K thru 12 students throughout the State and provide sub-
stantially equal educational opportunities for those students.”316 
2. Equally adequate: educational adequacy with a presumptive 
negative thesis 
As conceived by its leading theorists, educational adequacy partly cedes 
the sufficientarian negative thesis. Specifically, in response to the fairness ob-
jection, Anderson and Satz acknowledge that, at a certain point, large-scale in-
equalities in educational opportunities above the threshold do matter. For her 
part, Satz suggests that the mechanism for addressing large inequalities must be 
accounted for in the definition of adequacy itself.317 Furthermore, the “educa-
tional gap between the least advantaged and the middle range” could be dimin-
ished if “everyone [had] a reasonably high proportion of what others have” and 
if we were to “unbundle the high-stakes rewards from educational success”—
rewards such as access to health care, a decent standard of living, and meaning-
 
315. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 376 (Conn. 1977); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Row-
ley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982) (“The requirement that States provide ‘equal’ educational op-
portunities would thus seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible 
measurements and comparisons.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
24 (1973) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely 
equal advantages.”); Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 114 (Ala. 1993) (“‘Equal’ edu-
cational opportunities need not necessarily be strictly equal or precisely uniform, whether 
these opportunities are discussed in terms of school funding, of the programs purchased with 
such funds, or of the actual educational benefits offered.”). 
316. Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tenn. 1995); see Lake 
View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 500 (Ark. 2002) (“It is the State’s re-
sponsibility, first and foremost, to develop forthwith what constitutes an adequate educa-
tion . . . . It is, next, the State’s responsibility to assess, evaluate, and monitor . . . the entire 
spectrum of public education across the state to determine whether equal educational oppor-
tunity for an adequate education is being substantially afforded to . . . school children. It is, 
finally, the State’s responsibility to know how state revenues are being spent and whether 
true equality in opportunity is being achieved. Equality of educational opportunity must in-
clude as basic components substantially equal curricula, substantially equal facilities, and 
substantially equal equipment for obtaining an adequate education.”). 
317. Satz, supra note 8, at 434 (“[A]n education system that precludes the children of 
poorer families from competing in the same market and society as their wealthier peers can-
not be adequate.”).  
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ful work.318 Recall that Anderson proposes class- and race-based affirmative 
action in higher education to counterbalance positional advantages obtained 
from inequalities above the threshold. In an earlier piece, Anderson submitted 
that “opportunities to compete . . . beyond the sufficiency threshold must be 
genuinely open to all”; that is, there must be “a fair chance at being successful 
in the competition.”319 
In practice, educational adequacy also does not exhibit an unwavering 
commitment to the negative thesis. Courts “generally do not seek to enforce 
some absolute notion of adequacy, where disparities in resources are ig-
nored.”320 Rather, courts tend to view adequacy as a “dynamic standard,” rec-
ognizing “that, at some point, [spending above the threshold] will create intol-
erable disparities in opportunities.”321 All this suggests that the negative thesis 
operates, both conceptually and practically, as a rebuttable presumption in ade-
quacy cases. At the top of the distribution, inequalities above the threshold are 
presumptively valid unless they undermine the ability of students to function as 
equal citizens and compete for admission to higher education and high-quality 
jobs on comparable terms—that is, undermine democratic equality, however 
broadly or narrowly defined. 
This is not to suggest that the negative thesis is a weak presumption that 
can always be rebutted. For instance, I suspect that Anderson and Satz would 
hold steadfast to the negative thesis in response to the more general argument 
that the thesis “fails to establish that when everyone has enough, it does not 
matter how unequally additional resources are distributed.”322 Brighouse and 
Swift illustrate this alleged shortcoming:  
Suppose that all children have an adequate education . . . and that there is 
some leeway such that even the least well-educated children are being educat-
ed better than adequacy demands. Suppose, now, that a bounty of unexpected 
resources enters the system . . . . Wherever the resources are spent within the 
system, they will not undermine adequacy. How should they be distributed? 
The principle of adequacy makes no comment at all on this.323 
Brighouse and Swift think that such indifference demonstrates adequacy’s 
inadequacy because a sense of fairness should motivate us to direct “the new 
educational resources [to] those with lower than the median prospects.”324 But 
as long as those with lower chances for educational achievement are still able 
to function as equal citizens and compete for admission to higher education and 
 
318. Satz, supra note 286, at 165. 
319. Anderson, supra note 201, at 106. 
320. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1237. 
321. See id. 
322. Casal, supra note 186, at 307. 
323. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 125. 
324. Id. 
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high-quality jobs, Anderson and Satz are unlikely to accept that fairness neces-
sitates spending the additional resources on them. Anderson could observe that, 
on balance, the resources might be better spent on educating the elite, who will 
then be able to serve the interests and concerns of those with lower chances for 
educational achievement. Similarly, Satz might suggest that the new education-
al resources be spent in a way that maximizes the development of human talent 
so that it will “redound to everyone’s absolute advantage . . . . [by] increas[ing] 
the size of the social surplus.”325  
There is no urgency in deciding which of these arguments fares best be-
cause the factual predicate of the disagreement—“[s]uppose that all children 
have an adequate education”—is unlikely to happen any time soon, if ever. 
Perhaps a more apt criticism is that adequacy supposes that “when not everyone 
can have enough, egalitarian considerations have no relevance.”326 Once 
again, Brighouse and Swift illustrate the point, inviting us to imagine a scenario 
in which 
many children do not receive an education that is adequate in Anderson and 
Satz’s senses. . . . Reform A will have the effect of making the children who 
are destined for elite membership more responsive to the interests of those 
over whose lives they have asymmetric power, and it will also increase the 
level of social mobility, such that there will be a small increase in the percent-
age of children from disadvantaged backgrounds joining the elites. It will, in 
other words, produce a slight improvement in the level of adequacy. Reform B 
will make no improvement in the level of adequacy, but it will improve the 
prospects for secure, if ill-paid, employment for the lowest 10% of achievers, 
by improving their prospects of acquiring the soft skills valued by low-wage 
employers before they drop out of high school.327 
Brighouse and Swift think there are “reasons of justice” to choose Reform 
B over Reform A.328 Consistent with Rawls’s difference principle, they believe 
that educational inequalities can be justified only “when they redound to the 
benefit of the less advantaged.”329 Unlike Rawls, however, they do not regard 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity as lexically prior to the difference 
principle. So, on their prioritarian view, when faced with a choice between 
benefitting the worst off and promoting greater educational equality overall, the 
 
325. Debra Satz, Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship, 117 ETHICS 623, 
632, 645 (2007). This debate mimics one that has been around since the times of Plato, who 
thought the “best and brightest [children] should be educated in a distinguished way for the 
leadership roles in society,” and Aristotle, who “believed that education should be the same 
for all children of citizens.” Eric Thomas Weber, Dewey and Rawls on Education, 31 HUM. 
STUD. 361, 372 (2008). 
326. Casal, supra note 186, at 307. 
327. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 125. 
328. Id. at 125-26. 
329. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 9, at 455. 
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latter principle must yield.330 Likewise, for them, advancing the interests of the 
worst off should trump adequacy even if that adequacy has the effect of achiev-
ing more social equality. 
It may be safe to assume that, all things considered, Anderson and Satz 
would prefer Reform A over B.331 Nevertheless, Brighouse and Swift 
acknowledge that their hypothetical shows, at best, that adequacy cannot be 
“the sole principle of justice in the distribution of education” when not every-
one can have an adequate education.332 As an initial matter, I suspect that An-
derson and Satz are unwilling to concede that achieving adequacy is an impos-
sible task.333 Moreover, the presumptive negative thesis would not preclude 
egalitarian considerations until all children have an adequate education. So 
there is no conceptual barrier to deploying egalitarian principles that facilitate 
adequacy.334 Indeed, in practice, educational adequacy has been conspicuously 
infused with vertical equity.335 For “if adequacy requires getting all students 
above a certain threshold, it will tend to focus disproportionate resources on 
 
330. See id. at 451. This has led some to question “how a theory that subordinates the 
meritocratic principle to the principle of concern for the worst off is distinct from a concep-
tion that gives up the meritocratic principle completely.” Giesinger, supra note 246, at 46; 
see also Gina Schouten, Fair Educational Opportunity and the Distribution of Natural Abil-
ity: Toward a Prioritarian Principle of Educational Justice, 46 J. PHIL. EDUC. 472, 486 
(2012).  
331. Notably, however, Anderson claims that her sufficientarian conception of fair edu-
cational opportunity advances the difference principle, albeit “to different ends” than Rawls. 
Anderson, supra note 9, at 621. Moreover, Satz is willing to entertain the possibility that 
“there are indeed considerations concerning the lives of the worst off that can trump the val-
ue of fair equality of opportunity.” Satz, supra note 286, at 164. 
332. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 125-26. 
333. See Satz, supra note 286, at 167 (“[T]he idea of an education adequate for equal 
citizenship is a harder idea to operationalize than strict [or horizontal] equality, but it is not 
impossible.”). 
334. Roger Crisp, for instance, favors a sufficientarian-prioritarian hybrid, which gives 
“absolute priority . . . to those below the threshold.” Crisp, supra note 188, at 758 (emphasis 
added); see also Casal, supra note 186, at 318-23 (discussing three hybrids of sufficiency 
encompassing egalitarian and prioritarian principles and proposing that the negative thesis be 
revised “so that it merely denies that equality and priority should stand unaccompanied by 
sufficiency”); Crisp, supra note 188, at 758 (“Below the threshold, benefitting people mat-
ters more the worse off those people are, the more of those people there are, and the greater 
the size of the benefit in question. Above the threshold, or in cases concerning only trivial 
benefits below the threshold, no priority is to be given.” (emphasis added)); Koski & Reich, 
supra note 2, at 590 (“[T]he sufficiency framework can justify equality-enhancing transfers 
from the well off to the needy. If many people have more than enough and a few have less 
than enough, then taking from the many to boost the few above the threshold that marks the 
level of adequacy looks like a good thing.”).  
335. See Koski & Reich, supra note 2, at 616. 
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students who are less able to profit from instruction if this is required to get 
them above the specified threshold.”336  
Accordingly, several adequacy-based court decisions have approved of 
vertical equity funding “to compensate for differences in regional costs and 
student needs that translate into higher costs to supply the same quality of edu-
cation throughout the state.”337 Moreover, courts and legislatures have import-
ed vertical equity principles in utilizing the methods for “costing-out an ade-
quate education.”338 So, as Satz has pointed out, adequacy can import 
egalitarian considerations that “explain why some inequalities require greater 
remedial attention than others—namely, those inequalities that affect the pro-
spects of the least well off.”339 
3. Adequacy, meritocracy, and luck egalitarian responsibility 
It would seem that adequacy can accommodate two of the three principles 
associated with equality of opportunity—nondiscrimination and equal life 
chances (as high thresholds achieving approximately equal chances and vertical 
equity). Regarding the third, meritocracy, Anderson contends that a meritocrat-
ic conception of equality of opportunity “cannot guide us in the allocation of  
 
336. Strike, supra note 283, at 476; see Black, supra note 4, at 1373 (“[I]t may be the 
case that adequacy is impossible without certain levels of equity. So long as gross disparities 
are permitted to exist between schools, the schools on the lower end will always have to 
compete against other schools for vital resources, such as teachers, principals, and adminis-
trators, and struggle to attract racially and socioeconomically diverse student populations, 
which have significant effects on the overall achievement of a school and its individual stu-
dents.” (citation omitted)); Ryan & Saunders, supra note 4, at 469 (“The line between ade-
quacy and equity becomes especially hazy when a court acknowledges that underprivileged 
children may need more resources to succeed than other children.”); Satz, supra note 8, at 
435 (“Many of [adequacy’s] practical implications are likely to be similar to those endorsed 
by vertical equality of opportunity theorists.”); see also TAN, supra note 98, at 10 (“To be 
sure, sufficiency and equality are not independent of each other, and in fact in practice they 
are often closely related. It is possible that the meeting of some sufficiency criteria entails 
distribution toward greater equality in order to meet the needs of those falling short of the 
benchmark. In this way sufficiency can lead to a commitment to equality.”). 
337. Umpstead, supra note 216, at 298; see Briffault, supra note 1, at 38 (describing 
this version of adequacy as “equity plus,” which focuses “on the need for school financing 
systems to provide more than equal funding to certain groups of schoolchildren, particularly 
the urban poor, in order for those children to receive a truly adequate education” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also R. Craig Wood, Justiciability, Adequacy, Advocacy, and 
the “American Dream,” 98 KY. L.J. 739, 769 (2009-2010) (suggesting that some of these 
adequacy lawsuits are “adequacy masquerading as equity”). 
338. Koski, supra note 284, at 21-23; see Meaghan Field, Note, Justice as Fairness: 
The Equitable Foundations of Adequacy Litigation, 12 SCHOLAR 403, 409 (2010) (“The fact 
that funding equity remains a standard part of adequacy suits, while general education goals 
and implementation methods shift, is what allows adequacy suits to be equitable.”). 
339. Satz, supra note 8, at 436. 
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K-12 educational opportunities, where both the talent and motivation of those 
seeking education, and the structure of educational opportunities, are endoge-
nous to the decision being made.”340 Satz agrees, explaining that meritocracy: 
(1) “cannot tell us what the structure of educational opportunities should be, 
since that structure will itself help determine who comes to have merit”; (2) 
“would not offer a sufficient education with respect to either children with little 
inborn talent or those children who early on make poor choices”; and (3) 
“seems overly moralistic,” especially when it means “withhold[ing] educational 
opportunities from a young child who fails to work hard or is less talented than 
his peers.”341 
Anderson’s and Satz’s points are well taken; in response, Brighouse and 
Swift admit that their “meritocratic principle” cannot be “the sole principle of 
educational justice.”342 Nevertheless, adequacy “does not rule out a restricted 
form of meritocracy in which educational resources above the level that is ade-
quate for citizenship are distributed in proportion to children’s demonstrated 
intellectual ability and willingness to learn.”343 In other words, although meri-
tocracy should not be the distributive principle employed to determine the 
threshold or to allocate educational resources to enable children to reach the 
threshold, it could shape opportunities for those children achieving above the 
threshold.  
Conceivably, Anderson could embrace this restricted meritocracy as a way 
to introduce the additional opportunities that she thinks are needed above the 
threshold to help diminish positional advantages. And, if children from advan-
taged and disadvantaged backgrounds must utilize such effective opportunities 
together, it could advance her integration imperative as well. A full comple-
ment of effective opportunities might also facilitate the affirmative action pro-
grams Anderson envisions in higher education. Children from disadvantaged 
social backgrounds would not earn admission based merely on their adequate 
education and their disadvantaged status; they could earn a spot by benefiting 
from the effective opportunities above the threshold. This would present an out-
let for fostering the type of appraisal respect that luck egalitarian critics worry 
would otherwise be denied to children who are often the target of compensatory 
services.  
Incentivizing effective opportunities could also cultivate responsibility and 
respect for choice. Consistent with luck egalitarianism, inequalities above the 
 
340. Anderson, supra note 201, at 101. 
341. Satz, supra note 8, at 428-29. 
342. Brighouse & Swift, supra note 8, at 118-19. 
343. GUTMANN, supra note 188, at 134. 
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threshold that are the product of such option luck would not be unjust.344 Of 
course, children cannot be held fully responsible because they are not com-
pletely developed moral agents.345 Moreover, the objection that luck egalitari-
anism overstates the brute versus option luck distinction has relevance here. If a 
child’s choice to make use of an effective opportunity (option luck) is influ-
enced by preferences over which she has no control (brute luck), then in what 
sense should we hold her responsible for that choice? So there is some concep-
tual baggage that comes with luck egalitarian responsibility that cannot be fully 
addressed here.346 But we do not need to untangle all of these complexities to 
see a link between adequacy and meritocracy, at least above the threshold.  
CONCLUSION 
It is time to transcend the equality versus adequacy debate in favor of an 
earnest discussion about the proper balance of equality and adequacy. There 
may always be intransigent equality and adequacy theorists unwilling to for-
sake the equal-chances ideal or a robust negative thesis. But, while that debate 
has served its purpose, I suspect it is not of much benefit anymore to the advo-
cates and policymakers who must confront the unremitting, living, and breath-
ing tragedies of public education in this country.347 And “[f]inding a legal and 
philosophical solution to the problem of educational inequality will be a much 
more complex undertaking than a stark either-or-dichotomy between pursuing 
adequacy or equality suggests.”348 Moreover, as Anderson has recently noted, 
there is “no urgency in settling the equality versus adequacy dispute” for all 
time because “any feasible and normatively acceptable policies for making 
 
344. See Casal, supra note 186, at 322 (describing “sufficiency-constrained luck egali-
tarianism, which allows that some inequalities in outcome may arise justly but denies that 
individuals’ having less than enough is ever justifiable by appeal to voluntary choice”). 
345. See Gina Schouten, Educational Justice: Closing Gaps or Paying Debts?, 29 J. 
APPLIED PHIL. 231, 237-39 (2012).  
346. I would add only that any meritocracy-driven distribution of effective opportuni-
ties above the threshold should account for children’s relative, rather than absolute, effort 
level. See ROEMER, supra note 40, at 13-23. And, although children are not fully responsible 
moral agents, they can learn about being responsible by having their choices respected. See 
Jencks, supra note 37, at 524-25. Finally, I think there is less reason to be concerned about 
the consequences of failing to utilize effective opportunities given that the adequacy thresh-
old serves as a safety net. 
347. See William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational 
Policy Reform Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1154-55 (2004) (observing that the equali-
ty versus adequacy debate was “almost irrelevant” to the Ohio Coalition for Adequacy and 
Equity in School Funding, which employed the “Adequacy and Equity” slogan so that it 
“could draw in all of those [school] districts that felt aggrieved”). 
348. Darby & Levy, supra note 2, at 371. 
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progress toward either goal are liable to largely coincide in the foreseeable fu-
ture.”349 
Fortunately, many courts and practitioners seem to have already recognized 
that “there does not appear to be a significant difference between the equity and 
adequacy approaches to school finance reform,” at least as those theories are 
applied in our nonideal world.350 Indeed, “[a] comparison of the results in 
equality and adequacy states does not establish the superiority of one approach 
over the other.”351 Quite the opposite—“the largest group, in terms of sheer 
numbers of successful plaintiffs, has used a hybrid approach.”352  
I have attempted to show that those pursuing equality and adequacy can 
coalesce behind: (1) a concern for absolute educational deprivation and relative 
disparity; (2) approximately equal chances for educational achievement, attain-
able through high adequacy thresholds sensitive to children’s capabilities to 
function as equal citizens and to compete for admission to higher education and 
for high-quality jobs; (3) greater vertical equity through distributions of educa-
tional resources that mitigate the differential effects of social circumstances and 
natural endowments to enable all children to meet those thresholds; (4) merit-
based distributions of effective opportunities above the thresholds; and (5) so-
 
349. Elizabeth Anderson, Race, Culture, and Educational Opportunity, 10 THEORY & 
RES. EDUC. 105, 106 (2012). 
350. Briffault, supra note 1, at 47 (“[C]ourts [have] converge[d] on a common set of 
goals, including greater state definition of educational requirements; state adoption of per-
formance standards; state monitoring of and accountability for local educational outcomes; 
requirements that states cost out the price of an adequate education and then ensure provision 
of the necessary funds; partial equalization of financing, aimed more at bringing up the bot-
tom than holding down the top; and a special concern with the needs of educationally at-risk 
students or the poorest districts.”). 
351. Reynolds, supra note 167, at 750; see also Christopher Berry, The Impact of 
School Finance Judgments on State Fiscal Policy, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL 
PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note 1, at 213, 222-27 (concluding that deci-
sions invalidating school finance systems yield modest additional funding for school districts 
but failing to find any differential effects between equality and adequacy decisions); Mat-
thew G. Springer et al., The Impact of School Finance Litigation on Resource Distribution: 
A Comparison of Court-Mandated Equity and Adequacy Reforms, 17 EDUC. ECON. 421, 440 
(2009) (finding no statistically significant difference between resource distribution patterns 
following court-mandated equity or adequacy reforms).  
352. Jensen, supra note 3, at 27; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1769-70 (2006) (“[T]he dual commands of the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses, as well as the language of most state constitutions, have shaped 
the education debate into a dual inquiry of adequacy and equality. The former represents a 
due process or minimal entitlements type of challenge: Has the state provided an adequate 
minimum threshold of education? The second is a comparative inquiry reflecting equality 
demands: Has the state provided equal access to education as between jurisdictions or 
groups?”). 
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cial equality, beyond nondiscrimination and toward racial and class-based inte-
gration. 
This equality-adequacy symbiosis is by no means the solution to all of our 
educational failures. It does, however, provide a conceptual framework upon 
which to construct educational opportunities in a principled manner. Although 
it sets appropriate parameters, it can potentially liberate lawmakers otherwise 
deadlocked in conflicts over failing schemes of pure equality or adequacy. Fa-
tigued state courts, which continue to struggle with formulating remedies in 
school finance cases, might particularly welcome the latitude to fashion their 
relief towards equally adequate and adequately equal educational opportunities 
responsive to the facts and competing values and interests presented in specific 
cases. 
 
